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WHAT’S WRONG WITH POLICE UNIONS? 
Benjamin Levin* 
In an era of declining labor power, police unions stand as a success 
story for worker organizing—they exert political clout and negotiate 
favorable terms for their members. Yet, despite support for unionization 
on the political left, police unions have become public enemy number one 
for commentators concerned about race and police violence. Much criti-
cism of police unions focuses on their obstructionism and their prioritiza-
tion of members’ interests over the interests of the communities they police. 
These critiques are compelling. But, taken seriously, they often sound like 
critiques of unions in general, not just police unions. If public-sector union-
ism remains a social good, wholeheartedly embracing these critiques seems 
like a risky proposition. 
This Essay examines the strange case of police unions and asks how 
they are (and are not) representative of U.S. unionism. More pointedly, 
this Essay asks what critiques of police unions should mean for policing 
reform and the future of public-sector unionism. How are police unions 
different from other public-sector unions, and how might critiques of 
police unions apply to other public-sector unions? 
Ultimately, I argue that the challenge in articulating a theory of 
what makes police unions different highlights both the problem with police 
and the problem with how scholars think about unions. If police unions 
are objectionable because of their views and police conduct, this concern 
speaks to a problem with police—full stop. The problems with unions are 
only issues by extension. If the unions are objectionable because they 
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prioritize their members’ interests, the critiques are properly understood 
as undercutting public-sector unions generally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Union power in the United States has hit a nadir. Less than eleven 
percent of the labor force is unionized—a lower percentage than at any 
point since World War II.1 Twenty-eight states (including six since 2000) 
have passed “right to work” laws that restrict the ability of unions to collect 
dues from workers and reach exclusive agreements with employers.2 Recent 
years have seen union opponents aggressively (and often successfully) liti-
gate claims that would make it much more difficult for unions to organize 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See, e.g., Jake Rosenfeld, What Unions No Longer Do 1 (2014); Kate Andrias, 
The New Labor Law, 126 Yale L.J. 2, 5 (2016) [hereinafter Andrias, The New Labor Law] 
(“American labor unions have collapsed. While they once bargained for more than a third 
of American workers, unions now represent only about a tenth of the labor market and even 
less of the private sector.”); Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—
2019 (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
TM8P-86WU]. 
 2. See Right to Work States Timeline, Nat’l Right to Work Comm., http://www.nrtw.org/ 
right-to-work-states [https://perma.cc/CR5B-XVG2] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). 
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workers and raise money.3 At the same time, “gig economy” companies, 
globalization, and the forces of neoliberalism have undermined worker 
solidarity and the logic of labor law.4 Despite significant donations to 
Democratic political campaigns, unions have had limited success in con-
vincing politicians on either side of the aisle to prioritize positions or push 
for legislation that specifically benefits organized labor and its members.5 
But not all unions are similarly situated, and not all have floundered. 
As private-sector unions have struggled, some public-sector unions remain 
powerful political forces, extracting concessions from government employ-
ers and steering policies to benefit their members.6 Enter an incongruous 
manifestation of contemporary labor’s power: the police union. 
In many ways, police unions flout both traditional assumptions about 
organized labor and contemporary framings of the new labor movement.7 
Where unions often swing left, police unions swing right.8 Where much 
                                                                                                                           
 3. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2486 (2018); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1083 (2016) (mem.) 
(per curiam); Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 655–56 (2014); Unite Here Local 355 v. 
Mulhall, 571 U.S. 83, 83 (2013) (mem.) (per curiam); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 
Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 321–23 (2012). 
 4. See, e.g., David Graeber, The Globalization Movement: Some Points of 
Clarification, in The Anthropology of Development and Globalization: From Classical 
Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism 169, 169–70 (Marc Edelman & 
Angelique Haugerud eds., 2005); Raphael Kaplinsky, Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place 163–232 (2005); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Free 
Trade Reimagined: The World Division of Labor and the Method of Economics 193–
98 (2007); V.B. Dubal, The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work, Regulation, and 
Labor Advocacy in San Francisco’s Taxi and Uber Economies, 38 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. 
L. 73, 76 (2017); Jennifer Gordon, Regulating the Human Supply Chain, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 
445, 454–55 (2017); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting 
Back to Basics, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 479, 480–81 (2016); Noah D. Zatz, Does Work Law 
Have a Future if the Labor Market Does Not?, 91 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1081, 1111–14 (2016). 
 5. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, “The More Things Change, . . .”: Reflections on the 
Stasis of Labor Law in the United States, 56 Vill. L. Rev. 227, 227–28 (2011) (recounting 
the failure of Democratic administrations to advance the legislative interests of organized 
labor); Zev J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, A Moral/Contractual Approach to Labor Law 
Reform, 63 Hastings L.J. 695, 698 (2012) (“[L]abor law reform has been a failed promise 
under the previous two Democratic administrations, and likely will be under the current 
one as well.”). 
 6. See Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 1, at 5 n.2, 21; Jon D. Michaels, 
Privatization’s Progeny, 101 Geo. L.J. 1023, 1045 (2013) (“Government employees have 
fared far better than their counterparts in the private sector, where effective unionization 
has long been in a state of free fall. But . . . [l]abor scholars urge observers not to be misled 
by the comparatively rosy picture that stable public-sector union membership seems to 
paint.”). 
 7. But see Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski, The Public Sector Look of 
American Unionism, in When Public Sector Workers Unionize 1, 1 (Richard B. Freeman 
& Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988) (“Unions of fire fighters and police were well-established as 
exemplars of the craft-type organizations that once dominated American labor.”). 
 8. See infra section II.B. 
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modern labor organizing focuses on low-wage workers, police unions pro-
tect higher-wage professionals.9 Where unionism and antiracism sometimes 
have travelled hand-in-hand,10 police unions still represent predominantly 
white workers and frequently take public stands that are hostile to racial 
justice or that express outright racism.11 Indeed, after decades of disinter-
est, scholars recently have begun to study police unions because of their 
role in hampering criminal justice reform, shielding officers accused of 
violence against people of color, and defending racially disparate policing 
practices.12 In a moment when labor law scholarship tends to treat the 
interests of unions and the political left as inextricably linked,13 police 
unions provide a powerful counterexample. Or do they? 
                                                                                                                           
 9. See infra section III.D. 
 10. See Eric Schickler, Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American 
Liberalism, 1932–1965, at 1–13 (2016) (“The CIO and its allies fused ‘class’ and ‘race’ in 
an alignment that was forged amid the vast social and ideological turmoil of the 1930s and 
early 1940s.”); infra section III.D. But see Reuel Schiller, Forging Rivals: Race, Class, Law, 
and the Collapse of Postwar Liberalism 1–12 (2015) (introducing the collapse of the 
alliance between civil rights groups and labor unions in the San Francisco Bay Area in the 
1960s). 
 11. See Paul Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police Must Go, Nation (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-fraternal-order-of-police-must-go [https://perma.cc/ 
SRD9-6GB4] [hereinafter Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police] (“The FOP’s national 
leadership consists of seven white men . . . . [This] is striking in an organization that claims 
that 30 percent of its members are officers of color. And many local chapters appear to be 
run by white cops—even in cities with police forces that are predominantly of color.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 712, 713–22 (2017); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 
761, 813–15 (2012) [hereinafter Harmon, Problem of Policing]; Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. 
McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge the Police Privilege to 
Delay Investigation, 2016 U. Chi. Legal Forum 213, 238–39; Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 
116 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1222 (2016) [hereinafter Levine, Police Suspects]; Marcia L. 
McCormick, Our Uneasiness with Police Unions: Power and Voice for the Powerful?, 35 St. 
Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 47, 54–63 (2015); Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 545, 557–61 (2019); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 Duke 
L.J. 1191, 1222–39 (2017) [hereinafter Rushin, Police Union Contracts]; Stephen Rushin, 
Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 1343, 
1404–05 (2015) [hereinafter Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation]; Joanna C. Schwartz, 
Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 938–47 (2014); Seth W. Stoughton, The 
Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 2179, 2206 (2014) [hereinafter 
Stoughton, Incidental Regulation of Policing]; Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. 
McAdams & John Rappaport, Collective Bargaining and Police Misconduct: Evidence from 
Florida 2–3 (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 831, 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3095217 [https://perma.cc/VTN3-6JVC]; Maybell 
Romero, Prosecutors and Police: An Unholy Union 7–16 (Sept. 7, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447669 [https://perma.cc/4SBH-XVPC]. 
 13. See, e.g., Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 1, at 32–37; Benjamin I. Sachs, 
The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 Yale L.J. 148, 168–71 
(2013) [hereinafter Sachs, Unbundled Union]. But see generally Thaddeus Russell, Out 
of the Jungle: Jimmy Hoffa and the Remaking of the American Working Class (2003) 
[hereinafter Russell, Out of the Jungle] (critiquing left labor historians and arguing that 
the labor movement should be understood in terms of worker self-interest). 
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This Essay examines the strange case of police unions and asks how 
they are (and are not) representative of U.S. unionism. More pointedly, 
this Essay asks what increasingly common critiques of police unions should 
mean for policing reform and the future of public-sector unionism. In an 
effort to construct a more nuanced picture of police unions’ functions, 
this Essay situates the role of police unions within two disparate scholarly 
debates: (1) the literature on policing reform and (2) the literature on 
public-sector unions. How are police unions different from other public-
sector unions, and how might critiques and defenses of public-sector 
unions apply to police unions? Can scholars of policing avoid questions 
that plague (or define) the literature on the rights and social power of 
workers? Can labor law scholars continue to speak of “labor” as a monolith 
without grappling with the problematic aspects of police unions? And, per-
haps more pointedly, how much does scholarly and political discomfort 
with police unions reflect a deeper discomfort with unions that are power-
ful and with collective action by workers other than the most marginalized? 
In tackling organized labor’s place in law enforcement, this Essay 
engages with an emerging literature that takes police unions seriously as a 
significant component of the modern criminal system.14 For decades, crim-
inal procedure scholars have focused on judicial opinions as defining and 
shaping police practices.15 They framed the law of policing in terms of con-
stitutional decisions rendered by appellate judges.16 Formal and informal 
rules crafted outside of the courtroom by municipalities, police unions, 
and police departments had little place in the scholarly discourse surround-
ing and critiquing police misconduct.17 But, spurred by the rise of the 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See supra note 12. 
 15. See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and 
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1133, 1134–36 (1982); Yale Kamisar, Looking 
Back on the “Stone Age” of Criminal Procedure, 13 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 471, 472 (2016); 
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467, 1488–95 (2001). 
 16. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The 
Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 189–95 (1983); Dan M. 
Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo. 
L.J. 1153, 1158 (1998) (noting the Supreme Court’s strategy not to confront race directly 
but instead confront it with “general constitutional standards that d[o] not explicitly 
address race”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 3 (1997) (finding that the scholarly literature on the 
rules of criminal procedure focuses largely on constitutional debates and judicial glosses, 
providing only a limited picture of a larger system that doesn’t play by the rules). But see 
Rachel Harmon, Reconsidering Criminal Procedure: Teaching the Law of the Police, 60 St. 
Louis U. L.J. 391, 392–96 (2016) (emphasizing how much of the regulation of police comes 
from nonconstitutional sources, such as state legislatures, labor and employment law, 
common law doctrines of entrapment, and local ordinances). 
 17. But see Stephen C. Halpern, Police Employee Organizations and Accountability 
Procedures in Three Cities: Some Reflections on Police Policy-Making, 8 Law & Soc’y Rev. 
561, 561–77 (1973) (“Through litigation and the threat of litigation, such civil liberties as 
the right to criticize department policy or superiors, to join unorthodox organizations and 
to participate in political affairs, are being developed.”); David Alan Sklansky, Police and 
Democracy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1699, 1752–53 (2005) (describing the limited discussion 
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Movement for Black Lives18 and greater public access to police union 
contracts,19 police unions and their collective bargaining agreements 
(CBAs) are becoming a bigger part of the conversation.20 
Although commentators focused on police unions may have different 
approaches and political commitments, they tend to articulate similar 
critiques. Much criticism of police unions focuses on their obstructionist 
nature and how they prioritize the interests of their members over the 
interests of the public at large and the communities they police.21 These 
critiques are compelling—police unions shield officers and block outsider 
intervention in the regulation of policing. But, taken seriously, they sound 
like critiques of unions in general, not just police unions.22 To the extent that 
public-sector unionism remains a social good because of concerns for 
economic inequality and worker power,23 wholeheartedly embracing these 
critiques seems like a risky proposition. To the extent that the critiques of 
police unions ring true, are these critiques of unions, police, or local govern-
ment decisionmaking? How we answer this question is not simply a matter 
of theoretical consistency;24 it should be an essential component of deter-
mining what “police reform” should look like and also of understanding 
                                                                                                                           
surrounding reform of police departments). See generally Samuel Walker, The Neglect of 
Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important Areas of American Policing, 9 Police 
Prac. & Res. 95, 103 (2008) [hereinafter Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions] (“The 
related issues of the police subculture and of organizational cultures within police 
departments have not received sufficient scholarly attention.”).  
 18. See generally About Us, Movement for Black Lives, https://policy.m4bl.org [https:// 
perma.cc/J5ER-YDE7] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) (“In response to the sustained and 
increasingly visible violence against Black communities in the U.S. and globally, . . . more 
than 50 organizations . . . have come together with renewed energy and purpose to articulate 
a common vision and agenda.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Police Union Contract Project, Check the Police, http:// 
www.checkthepolice.org/#project [https://perma.cc/S693-R3KL] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020); 
see also Stephen Cohen, The Next Fight for Racial Justice: Police Union Reform, New 
Republic (Dec. 2, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/124811/next-fight-racial-justice- 
police-union-reform [https://perma.cc/76NN-B7TY]. 
 20. See supra note 12. 
 21. See infra Part I. 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, “Running the Government Like A Business”: 
Wisconsin and the Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 Yale L.J. Online 39, 67 (2011) 
[hereinafter Fischl, Running the Government] (“[S]o long as we live in a world in which 
corporate contributors enjoy a considerable capacity to shape the scope and direction of 
our politics, it seems . . . that the countervailing voice provided by public and private-
sector unions on behalf of working people is a necessary and undeniable good.”); Anne 
Marie Lofaso, In Defense of Public-Sector Unions, 28 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 301, 308 
(2011) (“[U]nions, including public-sector unions, are vital to a well-functioning 
democracy and therefore should be protected.”). 
 24. See Rick Hills, How Enthusiastically Should the Left Support Laws and 
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the role of police, unions, and the state in the criminal system and its 
attendant race- and class-based hierarchies. 
In addressing these questions, my argument unfolds in four Parts. 
Part I describes the dominant critique of police unions. This Part focuses 
on the image of the union as unaccountable, obstructionist, and conserva-
tive.25 Further, this Part situates these critiques within a broader set of 
concerns about police violence against people of color and other margin-
alized communities. Part II resituates police unions (and such critiques) 
within a different set of scholarly and political debates—those regarding 
the role of public-sector unions. In this Part, I argue that the critiques 
articulated in Part I resonate with the work of anti-union forces on the 
political right and among technocratic or neoliberal voices on the left. By 
way of analogy, in this Part I focus on teachers’ unions and other con-
troversial public-sector unions. Part III seeks to test this analogy by examin-
ing a range of ways in which we might distinguish police unions from other 
public-sector unions. This Part asks whether critiques of police unions 
could be accurate, while not sweeping in other public-sector unionism or 
implicitly supporting a broader anti-union agenda. Perhaps police unions 
are just different from other unions for some reason—for example, the 
ability to use force against civilians, the social dynamics and power imbal-
ances that make even rank-and-file officers more like managers (vis-à-vis 
civilians), the amount of bargaining power they can exercise, or the 
political affiliations of the unions and their members. 
Finally, Part IV steps back to identify the weaknesses in these distinc-
tions. Ultimately, I argue that the challenge in articulating a theory of what 
makes police unions different highlights the problem with police, the prob-
lem with the way scholars think about unions, and the problems with the 
critiques of police unions. If what makes police unions objectionable is 
their views and/or the conduct of police, this speaks to a problem with 
police—full stop. (The problems with the unions are only issues by exten-
sion.) Adopting this understanding of the critiques would speak to a 
radical vision of police reform—the problem is not that police are union-
ized but that they have so much power by virtue of constitutional doctrine, 
their monopoly on state violence, and so forth. This is a critique that 
resonates with the growing literature on police abolition and is properly 
understood as a critique of police as an institution. If what makes the 
unions and their conduct objectionable is the commitment to their mem-
bers’ interests over those of the public at large, though, then the critiques 
are properly understood as critiques of unions, or of public-sector unions. 
Adopting this understanding would make these critiques resonate trou-
blingly with calls for “civil service reform” and dismantling of the union as 
                                                                                                                           
 25. I use “conservative” here in the small “c” sense (i.e., the unions operate to protect 
existing structures and institutions while hampering change). That said, as discussed in 
section I.B, infra, critics also focus on the large “C” Conservatism of police unions (i.e., their 
affinity or support for Republican politicians and policies favored by the political right). 
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a social, political, and economic institution. At the very least, this approach 
might suggest that support for unions rests on an image of workers’ collec-
tives as relatively powerless. 
I. CRITIQUING POLICE UNIONS 
Generally speaking, critiques of police unions reflect two focal points: 
the obstructionist concern and the ideological concern. Critics treat these 
unions as a problem either because (1) they operate as impediment to 
reform by opposing specific policies and shielding officer misconduct; or 
(2) they provide political voice to a range of conservative or reactionary 
politics that stand in opposition to some desired set of values (e.g., racial 
equality, egalitarian democratic movements, etc.). These two critiques occa-
sionally overlap and can have much in common. But, to provide a clear 
articulation of the conventional account in the literature and in contem-
porary policy debates, this Part teases the two critiques apart and addresses 
them in turn.26 Critically, though, both of these strands in the literature 
reflect a general view that police unions operate to the detriment of society 
and stand as guardians of the criminal system’s abuses.27 
A. The Obstructionist Critique 
The first general line of criticism leveled at police unions sounds in 
the language of obstruction.28 Advocates and academics are concerned about 
police violence and the policing of marginalized communities, and police 
unions stand in the way of addressing those concerns.29 This obstruction 
                                                                                                                           
 26. This Part (and this Essay, more generally) addresses both legal scholarship as well 
as more popular commentary that I take to be a part of the broader criminal justice reform 
conversation. For similar approaches, see, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Toward A Radical 
Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 405, 406 (2018); Benjamin Levin, Blue-Collar Crime: 
Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and the Anti-Union Civil RICO Claim, 75 Alb. L. Rev. 559, 
568 (2012) [hereinafter Levin, Blue-Collar Crime]; Mariana Valverde, “Miserology”: A New 
Look at the History of Criminology, in The New Criminal Justice Thinking 325–27 
(Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017). 
 27. While police unions have received scant attention from labor law academics, 
Marcia McCormick has briefly begun to trace the contours of police union critiques from a 
labor-centric standpoint. See McCormick, supra note 12, at 54–59. This Essay adopts a 
different frame, but McCormick’s account is an important contribution to this otherwise 
thin literature on police unions as unions. 
 28. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Democracy and the Police 175–83 (2008) 
[hereinafter Sklansky, Democracy and the Police] (examining the difficulties presented by 
a self-regulating police force and exploring the idea that “giving rank-and-file officers more 
say in how policing is carried out” may achieve results more consistent with the “rule of 
law”); Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reform Fails, in Police Reform from the Bottom Up: Officers 
and Their Unions as Agents of Change 144, 149 (Monique Marks & David Sklansky 
eds., 2012). 
 29. This critique resonates with a common theme in public discourse, mass culture, 
and some legal scholarship of the “blue wall of silence” (i.e., police officers and members 
of the law enforcement community are perceived as displaying extreme solidarity with their 
coworkers, raising questions of perjury or cover-ups). See, e.g., Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 
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occurs at the macro level (i.e., unions and CBAs prevent the implementa-
tion of policies that might increase accountability or oversight)30 and at 
the micro level (i.e., unions assist officers charged with misconduct, often 
making it harder for oversight organizations or prosecutors to investigate 
or prosecute).31 
Policing scholar Rachel Harmon describes CBAs as “deter[ring] 
department-wide changes intended to prevent constitutional violations . . . 
dramatically.”32 Police officer-turned law professor Seth Stoughton sug-
gests that one of the three primary functions of police collective bargain-
ing agreements is to produce “grievance procedures that are often a central 
part of collective bargaining agreements [that] both discourage and frustrate 
attempts to discipline individual officers.”33 The Movement for Black Lives 
and a growing chorus of scholars and activists have emphasized the lack of 
police accountability for misconduct.34 Increasingly, commentators con-
cerned with this lack of accountability have turned their gaze to unions 
and the collective bargaining agreements that provide officer-friendly pro-
cedural rules.35 Certainly, a range of other actors and institutions (e.g., 
                                                                                                                           
464, 467 (1985) (“Due to a code of silence induced by peer pressure among the rank-and-
file officers and among some police supervisors, few—if any—formal complaints were ever 
filed by police personnel.”); Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization 
of America’s Police Forces 329 (2013) (“Police unions also help enforce the ‘Blue Code 
of Silence,’ the unwritten rule that police officers never rat out or testify against other police 
officers.”); Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias 
and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 233, 237 (1998) 
(“Police officers also sometimes lie under oath because of the ‘blue wall of silence[]’ . . . .”); 
David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 465, 481 n.60 (1992) (“The code of silence has been recognized and documented in 
litigation and studies of police culture.”). 
 30. See Stephen Rushin, A Response to When Police Kill, Berkeley J. Crim. L., Fall 
2018, at 96, 98 n.15 (collecting sources). 
 31. See Eleanor Heard, Are New York Police Officers Safely Playing or Playing It Safe? 
Eliminating the Forty-Eight Hour Rule, 57 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 133, 157 (2000). 
 32. Harmon, Problem of Policing, supra note 12, at 799. 
 33. Stoughton, Incidental Regulation of Policing, supra note 12, at 2211. 
 34. See, e.g., DeRay McKesson, Samuel Sinyangwe, Johnetta Elzie & Brittany Packnett, 
Campaign Zero, Police Union Contracts and Police Bill of Rights Analysis 1 (2016), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/5773f695f7e0abbdf
e28a1f0/1467217560243/Campaign+Zero+Police+Union+Contract+Report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7D89-L999] (“Police unions across the country have used the collective bargaining 
process to circumvent basic tenets of accountability, transparency, and fairness.”); Stephen 
Rushin & Allison Garnett, State Labor Law and Federal Police Reform, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 1209, 
1217 n.43 (2017); Kyle Jaeger, The Black Lives Matter Activists Have a Plan: Campaign Zero, 
ATTN: (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.attn.com/stories/2906/what-is-campaign-zero-black-
lives-matter [https://perma.cc/MCM7-45K5] (“In order to restore trust between the public 
and police, it is crucially important that we impose civilian oversight structures to hold law 
enforcement officials accountable.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Gilbert Rivera, Armed Not Militarized: Achieving Real Police 
Militarization, 20 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 227, 235 (2015) (describing “the problem with 
police unions” as involving barriers to accountability and a prioritization of job security over 
other values); Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 12, at 1376 (“[P]olice 
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courts, politicians, and media) might interfere with efforts to police the 
police,36 but critics increasingly have identified unions as erecting particu-
larly high barriers to public oversight.37 (It also may well be that CBAs are 
an easier point of entry for reformers than, for example, constitutional 
criminal procedure doctrine, which rests on a large body of decisions by 
politically unaccountable judges.) 
In important recent work, policing scholars have collected and 
analyzed a range of police CBAs, helping reformers and scholars appreci-
ate the ways in which these CBAs lay the groundwork for policing and 
shield police from public accountability.38 Campaign Zero, a policing reform 
organization affiliated with Black Lives Matter,39 has produced extensive 
reports outlining police union contracts and law enforcement officer bills 
of rights.40 In looking at police CBAs in “81 of the largest U.S. cities,” 
Campaign Zero concluded: 
Police unions have used their influence to establish unfair 
protections for police officers in their contracts with local, state 
and federal government and in statewide Law Enforcement 
Officers’ Bills of Rights. These provisions create one set of rules 
                                                                                                                           
unions commonly attempt to intervene in settlement negotiations with the intent of 
blocking reforms that may increase oversight or otherwise burden frontline police 
officers.”); Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of 
Democracy, 2016 U. Chi. Legal Forum 615, 617 (“The emergence of police unions, and 
the collective bargaining agreements they have won, have become a major factor in the 
governance of the police.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (describing the deferential 
standard courts should use in assessing officers’ use of force); Barbara E. Armacost, 
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 453, 469 (2004) 
(“[C]ourts evaluating the officer’s beliefs and action are not to engage in 20–20 hindsight, 
but to give the benefit of the doubt in close cases to the police.”); Kenneth B. Nunn, The 
Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal Process—A Critique 
of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 743, 
745–46 (1995) (discussing the cultural framing of criminal law that treats defendants as 
“villains” and law enforcement and prosecutors as heroic). 
 37. See, e.g., Fair Police Contracts, Campaign Zero, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/ 
contracts [https://perma.cc/Y4EF-LAV8] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020). 
 38. See Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 Duke L.J. 839, 846, 856–67 (2019) 
[hereinafter Levine, Discipline and Policing]; Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra 
note 12, at 1198–200. While such work on police union contracts remains a novel develop-
ment, scholars have done some similar work on state laws regulating police conduct. See 
Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis 
of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 185, 203–41 
(2005) (cataloguing provisions in law officers’ bills of rights). 
 39. See, e.g., Black Lives Matter Publishes ‘Campaign Zero’ Plan to Reduce Police 
Violence, NPR: All Things Considered (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/08/ 
26/434975505/black-lives-matter-publishes-campaign-zero-plan-to-reduce-police-violence 
[https://perma.cc/AV2C-XT4M]; Jon Swaine, Lauren Gambino & Oliver Laughland, 
Protesters Unveil Demands for Stricter US Policing Laws as Political Reach Grows, Guardian 
(Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/21/protesters-unveil-
police-policy-proposals [https://perma.cc/HH82-AS4E]. 
 40. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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for police and another for civilians, and make it difficult for 
Police Chiefs or civilian oversight structures to punish police 
officers who are unfit to serve.41 
That is, the toothlessness of police oversight is not simply the product of 
rights-restricting judicial decisions.42 Rather, feeble accountability mecha-
nisms are the direct result of concerted action by police and a host of 
“incidental” regulatory structures.43 
Indeed, recognizing this dynamic, some civil rights plaintiffs have 
even sought to use CBAs as evidence of unconstitutional departmental 
policies.44 For example, in one suit against the city of Chicago, the plaintiff 
claimed that “the CBAs between the police unions and the City have essen-
tially turned the code of silence into an official policy.”45 Similarly, the 
city’s Police Accountability Task Force concluded: 
[T]he code of silence is not just an unwritten rule, or an 
unfortunate element of police culture past and present. The 
code of silence is institutionalized and reinforced by [Chicago 
Police Department] rules and polices that are also baked into the 
labor agreements between the various police unions and the 
City.46 
The union and CBAs, then, operate as markers or structural guarantors of 
obstruction and unaccountable policing, particularly as they affect com-
munities of color, poor people, and other marginalized groups.47 
                                                                                                                           
 41. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 42. This court-centric (or, more accurately, Supreme Court-centric) account has long 
been a staple of liberal–legalist criminal procedure scholarship. See, e.g., Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 525, 525 (1975); 
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153, 214 (2002); Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and 
Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5, 9–12 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-
Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich. 
L. Rev. 2466, 2468 (1996). 
 43. See Stoughton, Incidental Regulation of Policing, supra note 12, at 2205–16 
(tracking the role of CBAs as “incidental regulation of policing”). 
 44. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Chicago, No. 05 C 6545, 2009 WL 1657547, at *9 (N.D. 
Ill. June 9, 2009) (describing a CBA as “undermin[ing] the ability of the police department 
to hold its employees accountable for their behavior”). 
 45. Shields v. City of Chicago, No. 17 C 6689, 2018 WL 1138553, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
2, 2018); see also Taylor v. City of Chicago, No. 17-CV-03642, 2018 WL 4075402, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 27, 2018) (“[T]he existence of this code of silence has been corroborated by the 
United States Department of Justice and acknowledged by the president of Chicago’s police 
officers union.”). 
 46. Cazares v. Frugoli, No. 13 C 5626, 2017 WL 1196978, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017); 
see also LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 277 F. Supp. 3d 969, 981 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“The entities 
of accountability, according to the DOJ report, accept the cover-up culture as an immutable 
fact rather than something to root out.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 47. See Letter from United Auto Workers Local 2865 to AFL-CIO (July 25, 2015), 
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18240/afl-cio-police-unions-racism-black-lives-
matter (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“By unconditionally insulating officers 
accused of brutality from facing consequences, police unions maintain the status quo of 
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The conflict between Philadelphia’s Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) 
Local 5 and the city’s reformist District Attorney (DA), Larry Krasner, 
provides a particularly noteworthy example of this obstructionist dynamic. 
Krasner, a former criminal defense and civil rights attorney, was elected 
DA on a radical platform, explicitly designed to tackle mass incarceration 
and issues of racial justice.48 As Krasner introduced new policies and 
sought to prosecute officers who used excessive force, he frequently butted 
heads with the union, which he described as “frankly racist and white-
dominated.”49 In a particularly controversial move, Krasner’s office 
established a “do-not-call list” of police officers: If officers had an extensive 
history of misconduct, they would be placed on the list, alerting prosecu-
tors that they would make risky witnesses (i.e., they might lie on the stand 
or be impeached with their history of misconduct).50 
The move to establish the list was framed not only in terms of ensuring 
successful prosecutions, but also in terms of working toward greater trans-
parency and accountability. The message was clear: The police were no 
longer off limits from official criticism, and “bad apples” did not deserve 
the sort of respect and deference that they previously had received.51 
Philadelphia’s FOP responded swiftly and strongly by suing Krasner.52 As 
one commentator argued, “Krasner’s tiny list [sixty-six out of 6,500 
officers] actually supports the union’s claim that it’s just a handful of ‘bad 
apples’ in law enforcement who are the problem. And yet the union is still 
suing the city for trying to keep these apples from ‘spoiling’ their court 
cases.”53 To union critics, then, the FOP was putting the interests of 
testifying officers ahead of the public interest. 
Krasner has not been alone in adopting this approach, as other 
reformist DAs nationwide have sought to use do-not-call lists as a way of 
                                                                                                                           
racial violence that upholds the exploitation of Black communities in particular, as well as 
other communities of color.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Maura Ewing, The Progressive Civil-Rights Lawyer Philadelphia Wants for 
District Attorney, Atlantic (May 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2017/05/philadelphia-district-attorney-election-reform/526812 [https://perma.cc/984H-
B7SY]; Jennifer Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, New 
Yorker (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/29/larry-krasners- 
campaign-to-end-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/4Q5F-3NRR]. 
 49. Gonnerman, supra note 48. 
 50. See Mensah M. Dean & Mark Fazlollah, FOP Sues Kenney, Krasner, Ross over 
Police ‘Do-Not-Call’ List, Phila. Inquirer, http://www2.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/ 
fop-lawsuit-kenney-krasner-ross-police-do-not-call-list-philadelphia-20181113.html [https:// 
perma.cc/9HLA-E5C3] (last updated Nov. 13, 2018). 
 51. See Mark Fazlollah & Chris Palmer, Philly DA Larry Krasner Seeking to Develop 
Comprehensive List of Tainted Cops, Phila. Inquirer (June 4, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/ 
philly/news/crime/philly-da-larry-krasner-seeking-to-develop-comprehensive-list-of-tainted- 
cops-20180604.html [https://perma.cc/CN8J-AAYC]. 
 52. See Dean & Fazlollah, supra note 50. 
 53. Scott Shackford, Philly Police Union Sues over Attempts to Keep Bad Cops off the 
Stand, Reason (Nov. 21, 2018), https://reason.com/blog/2018/11/21/philly-police-union- 
sues-over-attempts-t [https://perma.cc/F93D-KGCR]. 
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signaling disapproval for police misconduct.54 Many (including police 
leadership) view these lists as a second-best alternative necessitated by 
union-backed protections.55 As Tucson, Arizona Police Chief Chris Magnus 
puts it, “If I had my way, officers who lie wouldn’t just be put on a list, 
they’d be fired, and also not allowed to work in any other jurisdiction as a 
police officer ever again . . . . But unfortunately, we have to allow them 
back into the workplace [due to union contracts].”56 
Whether through pushing for “law enforcement officers’ bills of 
rights”57 at the legislative level or contractual provisions, unions act to shield 
officers from public view and from accountability for alleged misconduct.58 
If society recognizes that CBAs are a major component of policing regula-
tion,59 this argument goes, then police unions become a primary force in 
                                                                                                                           
 54. See Justin George & Eli Hager, One Way to Deal with Cops Who Lie? Blacklist 
Them, Some DAs Say, Marshall Project (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2019/01/17/one-way-to-deal-with-cops-who-lie-blacklist-them-some-das-say [https://perma.cc/ 
GJJ9-JKR8]. This focus on “bad apples” is frequently critiqued as a means of legitimating 
police practices and deflecting structural criticism. See Kristian Williams, Our Enemies in 
Blue: Police and Power in America 23 (2015) [hereinafter Williams, Our Enemies in Blue] 
(“This [‘Rotten Apple’ theory] is a handy tool for diverting attention away from the 
institution, its structure, practices, and social role, pushing the blame, instead, onto some 
few of its agents. It is, in other words, a means of protecting the organization from scrutiny 
and of avoiding change.”). The distinction between individual bad actors and structural 
defects carries particular significance in the policing context, where civil rights suits must 
assert a broader policy if the plaintiff wishes to obtain relief from the municipality, state, or 
governmental entity. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
 55. See George & Hager, supra note 54 (“Ronal Serpas, executive director of Law 
Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime & Incarceration, . . . said a better solution than 
blacklists would be for district attorneys to urge police leaders to implement ‘one and done’ 
policies. Such rules would require immediate firing for any work-related lie.”). 
 56. Id. He goes on to note that “[i]t frustrates the hell out of me . . . that we have 
employees receiving full pay but who can’t really function as full police officers.” Id. 
 57. These provisions—creatures of state statute—provide officers with procedural 
rights, often relating to disciplinary investigations after uses of force. See, e.g., Kami Chavis 
Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal 
Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 489, 522 
(2008). 
 58. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting 
Rights Act as a Blueprint for Police Reform, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 263, 307–08 (2017) 
(discussing union-bargained-for restrictions on access to police disciplinary records); Robin 
G. Steinberg, Police Power and the Scaring of America: A Personal Journey, 34 Yale L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 131, 133 & n.7 (2015) (“Police unions are quick to speak out against any criticism 
of police behavior, contributing to the ‘hero cop’ narrative of police who are under siege.”); 
Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 Yale L.J. 1156, 
1196 (1974) (describing “[d]emands by policemen for disciplinary procedures which 
effectively foreclose use of a public review board”). 
 59. See Stoughton, Incidental Regulation of Policing, supra note 12, at 2205–17 
(arguing that union contracts are one of many non-court-created regulatory regimes that 
structure contemporary policing); Dharmapala et al., supra note 12, at 30 (presenting 
findings indicating that CBA terms affect rates of police violence); cf. John Rappaport, 
Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 205, 212–18 (2015) 
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the construction of policing and police accountability.60 Rather than 
throwing up their hands at the capriciousness of courts, activists and aca-
demics adopting this critique come to see unions and the collective 
bargaining process as a major lever of power, a lever that might become 
the proper target for pressure to shift the rules and practices of law 
enforcement.61 
B. The Political Critique 
The second line of critique increasingly prevalent in the policing 
literature focuses less on the structural impediments presented by unions 
than on the public (or, perhaps, public relations) role of unions.62 Police 
unions often represent a conservative or reactionary vision of the criminal 
system and race relations in the United States.63 Where a range of politi-
cians, scholars, and activists have expressed concern about the realities of 
                                                                                                                           
[hereinafter Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation] (distinguishing between “first-order” 
and “second-order” modes of regulating law enforcement). 
 60. In one particularly noteworthy report, investigative journalists for The Washington 
Post showed that “[s]ince 2006, the nation’s largest police departments have fired at least 
1,881 officers for misconduct that betrayed the public’s trust, from cheating on overtime to 
unjustified shootings. But . . . departments have been forced to reinstate more than 450 
officers after appeals required by union contracts.” Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery & Steven 
Rich, FIRED/REHIRED, Wash. Post (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 61. See, e.g., Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 Vill. L. Rev. 953, 997 (2017) 
(calling for reforms that might come via CBAs); Rushin & Garnett, supra note 34, at 1226 
(arguing that the federal government should “pressure[] municipalities to renegotiate” 
problematic aspects of CBAs). 
 62. As one guide for police union leaders puts it, “[T]he media requires you use it or 
it will use you . . . . Second to political involvement, dealing with the media is the next most 
distasteful activity for almost all union officials . . . . The battle is always in the Court of 
Public Opinion, and if you forget that, your union will get into trouble.” Ron DeLord & Ron 
York, Law Enforcement, Police Unions, and the Future: Educating Police Management and 
Unions About the Challenges Ahead 83 (2017) (emphasis omitted). 
 63. See, e.g., Williams, Our Enemies in Blue, supra note 54, at 77–177 (tracking the 
rise of professionalized policing as inherently intertwined with social control of marginal-
ized and less powerful groups); Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 745 (“Police unions 
also actively opposed reform-oriented chiefs and civilian review boards, both for reasons of 
conservative and sometimes racist ideology and to protect police officers’ bread-and-butter 
interests, like pay, benefits, and job security.”); Shawn Gude, The Bad Kind of Unionism, 
Jacobin (Jan. 12, 2014), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/01/the-bad-kind-of-unionism 
[https://perma.cc/YJ7B-5HJ7] [hereinafter Gude, The Bad Kind of Unionism] (“The cop 
who rallies for collective bargaining today will be protecting Goldman Sachs tomorrow.”); 
Catherine S. Manegold, Rally Puts Police Under New Scrutiny, N.Y. Times (Sept. 27, 1992), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/27/nyregion/rally-puts-police-under-new-scrutiny.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Officials with the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, 
which organized and promoted the rally . . . did [not] . . . appear to discourage protesters 
from displaying obscene and inflammatory signs, like those depicting the Mayor with a large 
Afro-style haircut and swollen lips or another making reference to Mr. Dinkins as a 
‘washroom attendant.’”). 
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modern policing,64 police unions have resisted and have been quick to 
throw their weight behind politics and policies that appear to exacerbate 
racial tensions and the likelihood of violence. Faced with public concern 
about race and policing, the unions have given no quarter, adopting a 
confrontational and, at times, threatening posture.65 Police unions, to 
politically focused critics, represent a pernicious force, a force that should 
be excluded from the labor movement and perhaps eliminated altogether. 
In July 2015, the Black Interests Coordinating Committee, a subgroup 
of United Auto Workers Local 2865, the union representing 13,000 
University of California graduate instructors and student workers, passed 
a resolution asking the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) to “end its affiliation” with the 
International Union of Police Associations.66 The resolution situates police 
unions firmly within a framework of white supremacy and institutionalized 
subordination: 
Historically and contemporarily, police unions serve the interests 
of police forces as an arm of the state, and not the interests of 
police as laborers. Instead, their “unionization” allows police to 
masquerade as members of the working-class and obfuscates 
their role in enforcing racism, capitalism, colonialism, and the 
oppression of the working-class.67 
According to the language of the open letter to the AFL-CIO, police 
unions “channel resources towards upholding racist practices” in three 
particular ways: (1) “[l]obbying to oppose independent oversight by civilians 
and other governmental entities,” (2) “[c]ampaigning for political actors 
                                                                                                                           
 64. See, e.g., Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 1 
(2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Q965-9X4N] (explaining that President Obama created the 21st Century Policing Task 
Force because “of recent events that have exposed rifts in the relationships between local 
police and the communities they protect and serve”). 
 65. See, e.g., Shawn Gude, Why We Can’t Support Police Unions, Jacobin (July 31, 
2015), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/07/black-lives-matter-patrick-lynch-ferguson 
[https://perma.cc/L2US-DLWV] [hereinafter Gude, Support Police Unions] (“Police 
unions . . . have . . . behaved deplorably . . . . Ferguson[’s union] raised money online for 
Michael Brown’s killer. Baltimore’s did the same for the officers charged in connection with 
Freddie Gray’s death. And the Cleveland . . . Union raffled off a Glock as a fundraiser for 
the cop accused of killing eighteen-year-old Brandon Jones.”); Editorial, Offensive Tweet 
Shows Why St. Louis Police Officers Association Is Part of the Problem, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/editorial-
offensive-tweet-shows-why-st-louis-police-officers-association/article_791eaa5b-1697-5b7a- 
8727-3218b305ea4f.html [https://perma.cc/A57U-ZLJH] (“The clear signal was that police 
officers should know who their enemies are. Take whatever action necessary. Don’t feel 
terribly compelled to render quick assistance if these businesses call for help.”). 
 66. Mario Vasquez, Univ. of California Academic Workers’ Union Calls on AFL-
CIO to Terminate Police Union’s Membership, In These Times (July 27, 2015), http:// 
inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18240/afl-cio-police-unions-racism-black-lives-matter 
[https://perma.cc/WP9P-MSEY]. 
 67. Letter from United Auto Workers Local 2865 to AFL-CIO, supra note 47. 
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who support limited police accountability,” and (3) “[d]efending officers’ 
crimes of racist brutality in court.”68 In this account, police are disassociated 
from any status as labor,69 and the union simply becomes a tool to advance 
a set of politically objectionable ends.70 
To the extent that the expression of a collective voice is a generally 
recognized union function,71 police unions take full advantage of this 
function. “[P]olice unions have a strong voice at the state and local levels” 
and are seen by critics as embodying a deeply problematic voice or 
collective opinion.72 Indeed, U.S. police unions differ from police unions 
in other countries in large part because of this political role or function.73 
While “[t]he police forces in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom are unionized,” they “are generally restrained or prohibited 
from being involved in election campaigns of individual candidates or 
political parties.”74 That approach stands in marked contrast to the U.S. 
model, where “the overwhelming majority of . . . police unions are politically 
active in the campaigns of those persons elected to control the police 
themselves.”75 
Police unions’ role as “major players in the ‘Court of Public Opinion’”76 
has become a flashpoint as police accountability has become a matter of 
greater public concern.77 In the wake of highly publicized deaths of black 
                                                                                                                           
 68. Id. 
 69. But see id. (“Black lives are considered less important than job protection for 
police.”). 
 70. Lurking here is or may be an important distinction between “workers” as an 
imagined class of people and “labor” as an imagined subclass of workers. That is, perhaps 
the claim in the above quote accepts police officers’ status as workers, but rejects their status 
as labor. Presumably, labor, then, is conceived not in terms of class status, but class solidarity. 
Or, perhaps “labor” excludes workers whose status and interests are too closely aligned with 
those of management or capital. See infra sections III.B–.C. 
 71. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 163, 181 (explaining how unions have historically 
united people under a collective voice); Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the 
Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1156–69 (1991) (“[L]abor 
unions can be an effective, central tool in a feminist agenda targeting the gendered 
structure of wage labor. Collective action is the most powerful and expedient route to female 
empowerment; further, it is the only feasible means of transforming our deeply gendered 
market and family structure.”); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor 
Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1527, 1556 (2002) [hereinafter Estlund, The Ossification of 
American Labor Law] (noting how the prospect of tort liability might deter some employers 
from suppressing the efforts of their employees to organize a collective voice). 
 72. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1827, 1879 (2015). 
 73. See Ron DeLord, John Burpo, Michael Shannon & Jim Spearing, Police Union 
Power, Politics, and Confrontation in the 21st Century: New Challenges, New Issues 
239–40 (2d ed. 2008). 
 74. Id. at 239. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 240. 
 77. See, e.g., Debo P. Adegbile, Policing Through an American Prism, 126 Yale L.J. 
2222, 2224 (2017) (describing an “intense focus on policing in America,” precipitated by 
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civilians at the hands of police, union leaders were quick not only to stand 
up for the officers involved but also to affirmatively reject any stated concerns 
about police violence, police–civilian interactions, or race relations.78 That 
is, the voice or, more crassly, the “public relations” function of police 
unions tends to reflect a hard line—either endorsing unreconstructed 
tough-on-crime responses to debates about criminal justice policy or 
ignoring concerns outright.79 
As one glaring example, take the union response to the killing of 
Tamir Rice.80 On November 22, 2014, Cleveland police received a dispatch 
call about a black male with a “probably fake” gun sitting on a swing at a 
neighborhood park.81 Two officers responded to the call and arrived at the 
park.82 Within seconds, rookie officer Timothy Loehmann fired two shots 
at the black male—twelve-year-old Tamir Rice.83 As in a number of other 
high-profile police shootings, a Cuyahoga County grand jury declined to 
indict Loehmann.84 But the city of Cleveland ultimately reached a $6 
million civil settlement with Rice’s family.85 
Public outcry in the wake of Rice’s shooting came fast and furiously.86 
The fall of 2014 saw growing attention paid to police violence and the use 
                                                                                                                           
publicized killings of civilians of color); Samuel Walker, “Not Dead Yet”: The National 
Police Crisis, a New Conversation About Policing, and the Prospects for Accountability-
Related Police Reform, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1777, 1784–90 (describing the “national police 
crisis”). 
 78. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 12, at 48–50. 
 79. See Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke & Brian Roberts, 
Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order 38–39 (1978) (discussing 
the role of police in shaping public narrative). 
 80. Police union leaders frequently take similar approaches in police shooting cases, 
adopting an aggressive stance in the media as defenders of the officers involved. See 
McCormick, supra note 12, at 47–48 (discussing the union response to the Michael Brown 
shooting). 
 81. See Cory Shaffer, Cleveland Police Officer Shoots 12-year-old Boy Carrying BB 
Gun, Cleveland.com (Nov. 22, 2014), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/ 
11/cleveland_police_officer_shoot_6.html [https://perma.cc/2HK5-NK5C]; see also Tom 
McCarthy, Tamir Rice: Video Shows Boy, 12, Shot ‘Seconds’ After Police Confronted Child, 
Guardian (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/26/tamir-
rice-video-shows-boy-shot-police-cleveland [https://perma.cc/FRQ4-S2NP]. 
 82. See Shaffer, supra note 81. 
 83. See McCarthy, supra note 81; Shaffer, supra note 81. 
 84. See Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges in 
Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 85. See Mark Berman & Wesley Lowery, Cleveland Agrees to Pay $6 Million to Settle 
Tamir Rice Lawsuit, Won’t Admit Any Wrongdoing, Wash. Post (Apr. 25, 2016), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/04/25/cleveland-agrees-to-pay-6-
million-to-settle-tamir-rice-lawsuit/?utm_term=.ffc5d5697b35 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
 86. See Bryan Adamson, Reconsidering Pre-Indictment Publicity: Racialized Crime 
News, Grand Juries and Tamir Rice, 8 Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 1, 9 nn.41–43 (2017) 
(collecting sources). 
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of lethal force against people of color, particularly black men.87 Cell phone 
videos showing deadly police confrontations went viral on social media, 
and protesters rallied around the slogan “Black Lives Matter.”88 Rice’s death 
added fuel to the fire, feeding the perception that police were too quick 
to resort to deadly force in confrontations with black civilians.89 As with 
the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the failure to indict the 
shooting officer led to even greater outrage.90 At the same time, Cleveland’s 
police union (like unions in other police shootings) stood behind Loehmann 
and offered strong support for the officers involved.91 
There’s nothing remarkable about the fact that the union here would 
support its member.92 As I argue in Part II, that is a core function of unions. 
More noteworthy is the Cleveland Police Patrolman Association’s aggres-
sive approach once the family settled its suit.93 Rather than remaining silent, 
issuing a carefully worded release about loss of life, or even taking the 
opportunity to remind the public that no officer had been charged with a 
crime, the union went on the offensive. In an open letter to the media, 
union president Stephen Loomis wrote: “[W]e can only hope that the Rice 
family and their attorneys will use a portion of this settlement to help 
educate the youth of Cleveland in the dangers associated with the 
mishandling of both real and facsimile firearms.”94 Faced with widespread 
public outrage, the union had doubled down by implying once again that 
Rice’s death was his own fault and that his family, not the police, had work 
to do going forward. The Patrolman’s Association, in this account, wasn’t 
simply being obstructionist by shielding Loehmann from accountability. It 
also was using its power to operate as a public vehicle for a set of defensive, 
hostile sentiments. 
                                                                                                                           
 87. See, e.g., Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1794, 1794–96 
(2015); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: 
Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 23, 24 
(2014); Adamson, supra note 86, at 9 nn.41–43. 
 88. See generally Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 391, 393–94 
(2016) (discussing the phenomenon of organized copwatching by local communities as a 
means to hold police departments accountable). 
 89. See Williams & Smith, supra note 84. 
 90. See generally Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 Geo. L.J. 745 (2016) 
[hereinafter Levine, How We Prosecute] (describing responses to grand jury decisions in 
officer shooting cases). 
 91. See Eric Heisig, Tamir Rice Settlement Should Help Educate Kids on Guns, Cleveland 
Police Union President Says, Cleveland.com (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.cleveland.com/ 
court-justice/index.ssf/2016/04/tamir_rice_settlement_should_h.html [https://perma.cc/ 
YCZ8-NFEC] (last updated Jan. 11, 2019). 
 92. Why Is This Happening? With Chris Hayes: Ending Mass Incarceration with Larry 
Krasner, NBC News: Think (Jul. 10, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/how-
prosecutors-can-help-end-mass-incarceration-larry-krasner-podcast-ncna890126 [https:// 
perma.cc/422E-M2WU] (“[T]he job of a union head to some extent is to avoid 
accountability on the part of its members.”). 
 93. See Heisig, supra note 91. 
 94. Id. 
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A look at the official social media accounts of many police unions 
reveals a similar approach. When Brooklyn DA Eric Gonzalez released an 
adverse credibility list in November 2019 (similar to the list released by 
Krasner, discussed above),95 New York City Police Benevolent Association 
President Patrick Lynch released a statement decrying Gonzalez as a 
traitor to his role in law enforcement: 
It is clear that . . . Gonzalez has abandoned his prosecutorial role. 
He sides with the criminals, not crime victims. He knows that 
truthful police testimony gets thrown out every day in our courts, 
often based on a judge’s whims and biases. He knows that 
publicizing this information will destroy the careers of honest 
police officers and torpedo the cases against violent, gun-toting 
criminals—assuming his office bothers to prosecute them at all. 
He could have and should have fought the request to release 
these records. He chose not to do so. In northern Brooklyn 
alone, 218 people have been shot this year, an 11.2% increase 
over last year. If the victims and their families want someone to 
answer for this violence, they should head to Gonzalez’s office. 
They might well find an “out of business” sign on the door.96 
As framed by the union, challenging police violence or misconduct is 
tantamount to abetting “gun-toting criminals.” And providing oversight is 
implicitly linked to violent crime rates. The voice of the union, then, is one 
that brooks no compromise and is open to no critique. It is that voice or 
role that has so riled many scholars and activists. 
“Law enforcement unions,” one commentator argues, “are not simply 
barriers to criminal justice reform and decarceration because of economic 
concerns for their members . . . . [T]heir commitment is not only to mass 
incarceration as a job provider, but to the system of racist oppression and 
unjust societal organization that these jobs uphold.”97 In this account, 
white supremacy and the violent suppression of marginalized populations 
is not an unintended byproduct of police unions’ political positions.98 
Rather, there is some core structural flaw with police unions that makes 
                                                                                                                           
 95. See Joseph Goldstein, Why 7 Police Officers Were Blacklisted in Brooklyn, N.Y. 
Times (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/nyregion/police-credibility-
brooklyn-district-attorney.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); supra notes 48–54 
and accompanying text. 
 96. The Police Benevolent Association of N.Y.C. (@NYCPBA), Twitter (Nov. 6, 2019), 
https://twitter.com/NYCPBA/status/1192217524550717440 [https://perma.cc/94ZW-YDEA]. 
 97. Natasha Lennard, Police Unions’ Opposition to Prison Reform Is About More 
Than Jobs—It’s About Racism, Intercept (Aug. 14, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/ 
08/14/police-unions-prison-reform [https://perma.cc/DB75-GX4Z]. 
 98. See Vasquez, supra note 66 (“Police unions in particular emerge out of a long 
history of police intervention in labor politics and its complicity in racial violence . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from United Auto Workers Local 2865 
to AFL-CIO, supra note 47)). 
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them direct defenders or proponents of a particular brand of policing that 
is inextricably linked to a history of racial subordination.99 
Perhaps the biggest target for this line of critique has been the FOP. 
As police–civilian tensions have attracted increasing attention, the FOP 
(both on the national level and among locals) has taken a hard line—
actively opposing reformist initiatives and vocally supporting politicians 
and policies hostile to criminal justice reform and racial justice.100 Particu-
larly notable has been the FOP’s warm relationship with Donald Trump, 
both in the lead-up to his election and once he took office.101 The union’s 
decision to endorse then-candidate Trump was hardly an anomaly—police 
unions play an active role in the political sphere, and police union 
endorsements have played significant roles in recent elections.102 But the 
decision, coupled with the fraught racial politics of the election, did not 
go unnoticed, generating even greater outrage from police union critics.103 
                                                                                                                           
 99. Cf. Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 
111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1597, 1604–05 (2017) (“[Criminal legal] institutions enforce an 
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 100. See, e.g., Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police, supra note 11; Letter from Chuck 
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with the Columbia Law Review) (announcing support for the First Step Act and the risk 
assessment tools and sentencing reforms it establishes). 
 101. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Fraternal Order of Police, Fraternal Order of Police 
Endorses Trump!!! (Sept. 16, 2016), https://fop.net/CmsDocument/Doc/pr_2016-0916.pdf 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also, e.g., Nathalie Baptiste, Here’s What the 
Biggest Police Union Wants from Trump, Mother Jones (Dec. 13, 2016), https:// 
www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/12/heres-what-biggest-police-union-wants-trump-his-
first-100-days [https://perma.cc/X6CC-B636]; Tom Jackman, Fraternal Order of Police 
Union Endorses Trump, Wash. Post (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
true-crime/wp/2016/09/16/fraternal-order-of-police-union-endorses-trump/?utm_term 
=.d8c22265f2b0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting a union leader as stating 
that Trump “made commitments to us that he would support law enforcement if he was 
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 102. See Michael Zoorob, Blue Endorsements Matter: How the Fraternal Order of 
Police Contributed to Donald Trump’s Victory, 52 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 243, 247–49 (2019) 
(“For Trump in 2016, blue endorsements mattered precisely because police are so widely 
organized across communities. When hundreds of thousands of men and women in blue 
proclaimed Trump their candidate, many other Americans got the message.”). 
 103. See Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police, supra note 11. 
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In one particularly striking op-ed, policing scholar Paul Butler argues 
that it is time to abolish the FOP.104 While Butler recognizes a range of 
legal impediments to this proposal, he contends that the organization has 
come to operate as an organ of white supremacy.105 According to Butler, 
the FOP “consistently take[s] stances against the safety and rights of black 
Americans. As a result, the organization serves as a union cum fraternity 
for white cops and has a retrograde effect on policing, especially as it 
relates to civil rights.”106 In this rendering, the union operates as a vehicle 
for politically reactionary goals. Where reformers seek to improve police–
civilian relations or to advance goals of racial justice, the FOP operates as 
a vehicle of white supremacy.107 As Butler puts it, “The FOP, as currently 
constituted, should be relegated to the same historical dustbin as 
organizations like the Sons of the Confederacy and the White Citizens 
Council.”108 And, indeed, other scholars have traced modern policing to 
British colonial practices designed to “manag[e] disorder and protect[] 
the propertied classes from the rabble.”109 
To Butler and those other critics, police unions operate as a means of 
reinforcing and consolidating police power. Historically, police have 
served as “protectors of privilege,” and—according to critics—police 
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See generally Alex S. Vitale, The End of Policing 29 (2017) [hereinafter Vitale, The End 
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communities working to solve their own problems.”); Derecka Purnell, What Does Police 
Abolition Mean?, Bos. Rev. (Aug. 23, 2017), http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/derecka-
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reforms “will not save” law enforcement that “arbitrarily enforces laws according to 
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 108. Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police, supra note 11. 
 109. Vitale, The End of Policing, supra note 107, at 35. 
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unions serve as the unreconstructed voice of that regressive impulse.110 If 
we accept the critiques of criminal policy as reinforcing white suprem-
acy,111 and of expansive police power as extending the governance model 
of the Jim Crow South,112 then it’s not hard to see why police unions would 
be deeply objectionable.113 
Having laid out these two primary lines of critique, the next Part seeks 
to resituate police unions within the literature on public-sector unions. In 
doing so, I hope to highlight the limitations of viewing police unions only 
through the lens of criminal law. 
II. POLICE UNIONS AS UNIONS 
As a descriptive matter, the critiques outlined in the previous Part are 
fair as far as they go. Police unions have served as a significant impediment 
to many reformist and transformative efforts. Police unions have stood 
behind many officers accused of violence and racism. And police unions 
have undoubtedly taken political positions that might trouble many critics 
and commentators on the left (broadly conceived). But, as I argue in this 
Part, these critiques can’t and shouldn’t be divorced from longstanding 
critiques of other public-sector unions. The legal academic literature on 
police unions has focused largely on the policing aspect, rather than the 
union aspect, of police unions.114 Most scholarly attention has come from 
the world of criminal justice scholars, rather than academics focused on 
                                                                                                                           
 110. See generally Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police 
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 113. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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2020]  POLICE UNIONS 1355 
 
labor law.115 In these accounts, police unions are treated as a feature of the 
criminal legal landscape and players in the design of criminal policy but 
not necessarily a major player in the design of contemporary labor 
markets. To the extent that labor law has a role to play, it is in better under-
standing police;116 historically, scholars have not treated police unions as 
a vehicle or case study for better understanding labor law or the labor 
movement.117 
Such a criminal law-centric account provides a useful corrective to 
traditional, court-focused criminal justice scholarship,118 recognizing that 
the “law on the ground” relies on a range of different sources and 
actors.119 Yet, even this realist approach often suffers from a broader 
pathology of criminal law scholarship (and legal scholarship generally):120 
the tendency to silo or exceptionalize criminal law.121 Additionally, this 
                                                                                                                           
 115. But see generally Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12 (exploring “how public sector 
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[hereinafter Andrias, An American Approach] (critiquing the labor–employment law 
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28 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 163, 165–66 (2007) (critiquing the distinction among labor 
law, employment law, and employment discrimination as failing to paint an accurate picture 
of the laws that govern the workplace); Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in 
Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law 
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“family law” as a distinct category in the social and legal order produces ideological and 
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Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 5 (2011) (critiquing the move to 
exceptionalize “family law” as a distinct area of study). 
 121. See Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries of ‘Criminal Justice’, 15 Ohio St. 
J. Crim. L. 619, 633 (2018) (“Put simply, the siloing of legal areas is a major obstacle to a 
necessarily holistic and sweeping critique, not to mention a more expansive vision of what 
reform could look like.”). 
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approach plays into a broader narrative in which police unions are clearly 
distinguishable from any other corner of organized labor. “Police unions,” 
some labor leaders suggest, “are the duck-billed platypus of the labor 
movement.”122 
In one of the rare, and critically important, labor-centric accounts of 
police unions, labor law scholar Catherine Fisk and policing scholar Song 
Richardson stress a different frame for studying law enforcement.123 “The 
debates over police unions are part of a larger legal and policy debate over 
whether public employee unions are agents of or obstacles to government 
reform.”124 This frame for discussing police unions is critically important 
“because local government employees (including police) are among the 
most densely unionized in the country.”125 Questions of policing are 
inherently questions of governance, which in turn rely on understanding 
how power and decisionmaking authority are allocated at the governmen-
tal level.126 Conversations about policing and police unions, viewed in this 
light, are inherently conversations about governance, but also about work. 
This Part first provides a brief overview of the law governing police 
unions and police unions’ relationship to common theoretical justifica-
tions for unionization. While I don’t aim to provide an exhaustive account 
of state public-sector labor law, it is useful to recognize the legal 
architecture that underpins police unions’ power. Or, at the very least, it 
is worth recognizing what aspects of police unions are common features 
of other unions. Next, this Part describes the potential parallels between 
the critiques traced in Part I and the discourse surrounding other public-
sector unions. Ultimately, I argue, despite some obvious legal and 
structural differences between the relevant unions and labor markets, 
police union critiques sound an awful lot like critiques leveled at other 
public-sector organizing. 
                                                                                                                           
 122. DeLord & York, supra note 62, at 11. DeLord and York go on to argue that—
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criminal literature . . . tends to situate police federalism in a binary schematic: The federal 
government directs federal law enforcement . . . while the states hold authority over state 
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A. Police Unions 
“Police unions on the surface look like every other labor union,” 
observe police labor advocates Ron DeLord and Ron York.127 Police unions 
“organize around mutual protection, improving wages, benefits and 
working conditions, gaining collective bargaining rights and obtaining 
professional standards.”128 When it comes to state labor law, police unions 
often look quite similar to other public-sector unions. Five states—
Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee—
explicitly forbid police from bargaining collectively.129 But those same 
states also forbid public school teachers and (with the exception of 
Georgia) firefighters from bargaining collectively.130 Similarly, forty-eight 
states treat police and teachers the same when it comes to the legality of 
collective wage negotiation.131 There are exceptions: Texas, for example, 
forbids public-sector workers from bargaining collectively, but makes an 
exception for police officers.132 
More importantly, though, in a number of recent, high-profile efforts 
to strip public-sector unions of legal protections, police unions (along with 
other first responders) have been excepted.133 For example, when 
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker drew national attention for seeking to 
balance the state’s budget by chipping away at public pensions and public-
sector unions, police were treated differently.134 Labor law scholars 
generally view the differential treatment of police unions as reflecting a 
political calculus rooted in the voting patterns of union members.135 
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sector-rules.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that while Governor Scott 
exempted police officers and firefighters from a bill that would roll back collective 
bargaining rights, Governor John Kasich of Ohio did not exempt public safety employees 
and “saw his efforts undone by voters in a referendum within eight months”). 
 135. See, e.g., Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 133, at 1140; Kasler, supra 
note 134 (noting that Governor Kasich’s anti-state-workers-union bill may have been 
designed to affect employees such as teachers whose union supported Kasich’s opponent 
and campaigned against him). 
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William Forbath has argued that “today’s anti-public-sector-collective-
bargaining laws . . . are designed to enfeeble public sector unionism not 
for the asserted rationale of relieving the budget crises, but for the purpose 
of depriving progressive lawmakers and progressive legislation of powerful 
support.”136 And perhaps lending credence to this argument, in states 
where police unions were not singled out from other public-sector unions, 
Republican politicians were much more hesitant to back anti-union 
bills.137 
Outside of these political calculations, though, the most significant 
legal difference between the treatment of police unions and other public-
sector unions has to do with the right to strike. Public-sector unions 
generally face many more restrictions on striking than their private-sector 
analogs.138 But the most dramatic restrictions tend to affect police and 
other public employees treated as “essential to public safety.”139 Indeed, 
despite contemporary support from conservative and otherwise-anti-union 
politicians, organizing police officers historically have been met with oppo-
sition because of fears that they might strike, leading to lawlessness and 
crime spikes.140 That is, the specter of striking—a major concern for any 
public-sector unionization project or union activity that touches the 
“public interest”—remains an animating feature of the legal architecture 
of police unions.141 
These state laws cannot begin to tell the entire story of police unions 
and their legal, social, and political standing. But they provide some 
                                                                                                                           
 136. Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 133, at 1140. 
 137. See Kasler, supra note 134 (quoting law professor Benjamin Sachs as noting that 
“[t]he opposition that we’re seeing among the Republican Party in Ohio, which we’re not 
seeing in Wisconsin, may well have to do with the fact that police and fire are not exempted 
in Ohio and are in Wisconsin” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 138. See, e.g., Potts v. Hay, 318 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Ark. 1958) (“[E]very judicial decision 
on the subject holds that there is no right to strike against the government.”); Cty. Sanitation 
Dist. No. 2 v. L.A. Cty. Emps. Ass’n, Local 660, 699 P.2d 835, 838 (Cal. 1985) (“A strike by 
employees of the United States government may still be treated as a crime, and strikes by 
state and local employees have been explicitly allowed by courts or statute in only 11 states.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 139. See Sanes & Schmitt, supra note 129, at 34–35 (collecting statutes). 
 140. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 735 (“[B]usiness and anti-labor groups 
feared that unionized police would strike and, more important, would not stop other 
employees from striking and picketing.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of 
Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 222 (1993) (describing a “10-year no-strike commitment” in 
a labor agreement governing a public construction project); Metro. Milwaukee Ass’n of 
Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 431 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The County does not 
require its contractors to negotiate no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements 
with their unionized workers, common as such clauses are.”); David M. Rabban, Can 
American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 
Yale L.J. 689, 718–19 (1990) (discussing evidence suggesting that the costs of strikes by 
public employees may be exaggerated). 
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scaffolding for a more nuanced discussion of police labor.142 Perhaps more 
important, though, are some general governing principles that relate to 
all labor unions, including police unions—most notably, the duty of fair 
representation. In the private sector, the duty of fair representation was 
first articulated by the Supreme Court in two 1944 cases, Steele v. Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad Co.143 and Wallace Corp. v. NLRB.144 The cases, both 
decided on December 18, 1944, “established the principle that a union 
must protect the interests of all workers in the bargaining unit it 
represented regardless of union membership.”145 Both cases involved a 
disfavored subset of the workers—either a racial or political minority.146 
And, in both cases, the Court concluded that the union could not penalize 
dissidents and must continue to represent all the workers in the bargaining 
unit.147 This duty extends to public-sector unions.148 
While accounts of police unions focused on policing policy emphasize 
the unions’ obstructionist tendencies,149 it’s important to recognize that 
the “obstruction” at the heart of the critiques is central to the function of 
unions. That is, the duty of fair representation speaks the language of 
obstruction—it is the union’s job to represent and protect the rights of its 
members.150 Unions provide friction in the workplace, operating as a 
barrier to employers who might otherwise run roughshod over workers in 
an attempt to maximize profits. In their influential economic analysis, 
What Do Unions Do?, Richard Freeman and James Medoff argue that unions 
have two roles or “faces” in society and in the workplace: the “monopoly 
                                                                                                                           
 142. For more on state labor law and its relationship to police unions, see Rushin & 
Garnett, supra note 34, at 1217–37 (describing how state labor laws can complicate federal 
intervention in local police practices). 
 143. 323 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1944). 
 144. 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). 
 145. Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, 
Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 24 (1999). 
 146. See id. at 41–42 (discussing the cases). 
 147. See id. 
 148. See Jack R. Clary, Joel A. D’Alba & Parker Denaco, State and Local Government 
Bargaining, 5 Lab. L. 434, 463 (1989) (“In states with public sector unions, [the duty of fair 
representation] has been imposed by state statutes, administrative regulations or case law 
that have been liberally influenced by their federal antecedents.”). 
 149. See supra Part I. 
 150. The duty in the police context (as in other contexts) certainly is not absolute. See, 
e.g., Casanova v. City of Chicago, 793 N.E.2d 907, 916 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“[T]he Union 
did not breach its duty of fair representation to Casanova when it declined to bring a 
challenge to the arbitral award in the circuit court.”); Ramsey v. City of Pontiac, 417 N.W.2d 
489, 494 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the duty of fair representation did not require 
the union to investigate an officer’s claim, which clearly violated the bargaining agreement); 
Tchida v. Police Officers’ Fed’n of Minneapolis, 375 N.W.2d 856, 858–59 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985) (holding that “the duty of fair representation applies only to matters where the union 
serves as the exclusive representative,” not to disciplinary hearings in which the officer has 
other representation). 
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face” and the “collective voice/institutional response face.”151 The monop-
oly face (a clear analog to the obstructionist role so heavily critiqued in the 
policing context) is described as the union’s ability to bargain collectively 
and to raise wages for workers.152 Unions, according to this classic account, 
serve a critical role in aggregating worker power and preference:153 “At 
their best, unions use [their] power to bring to the workplace not only 
improved wages and working conditions but also a level of industrial 
democracy and human dignity that is impossible to measure in dollars and 
cents.”154 
To many scholars, these functions or structural benefits extend well 
beyond the confines of the workplace.155 If we accept this view of worker 
collective action as constitutive both of individual identity and solidarity or 
group identity,156 then the two functions identified by Freeman and Medoff 
operate in tandem as essential components of strengthening an engaged 
polity. Unions provide power to individual workers by both standing as an 
obstacle to employer power and giving voice to the worker as a political 
and social agent.157 
The two critiques articulated in Part I neatly map onto the two 
generally recognized functions of the union: to protect its members’ 
interests and to advance broader politics, policies, or political goals that its 
                                                                                                                           
 151. Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 5–6, 13 (1984). 
While hugely influential in the literature, the two faces identified by Freeman and Medoff 
certainly are not the only functions that unions serve. That said, other accounts of unions’ 
functions tend to sound in similar registers. See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 Yale L.J. 1107, 
1112–13 (1969) (focusing on unions’ role in providing monopoly bargaining power and 
individual political representation in the context of industrial democracy). 
 152. See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 151, at 5–6, 13. 
 153. Id. at 10. 
 154. Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House: Institutional Reform Litigation in 
the Labor Movement, 1989 Duke L.J. 903, 915. 
 155. See Cyntha Estlund, Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a 
Diverse Democracy 177 (2003) (“‘Reciprocal action’ through collective activity [in the 
workplace] not only fosters particular relationships and usable ties but also more diffuse 
and generalized feelings of empathy and understanding, of connectedness and being-in-
this-togetherness among citizens.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, Passion and Reason in Labor Law, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 313, 363 (2012) [hereinafter Rogers, Passion and Reason in Labor Law] (“[W]orkers’ 
collective action is neither aberrational nor a threat to workers’ autonomy—rather, it is 
partially constitutive of workers’ autonomy . . . .”); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and 
the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 73, 84 (1988) (“To the extent that the unfair labor practices can thus be understood 
as protecting formation of an autonomous group identity, they comprise the constitutive 
aspect of the [National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)].”). 
 157. Cf. Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive 
Sociology 14 (1992) (“Classes and other antagonistic social collectives are continually 
engaged in a struggle to impose the definition of the world that is most congruent with their 
particular interests.”). 
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members support.158 As Part IV outlines, opposition to police unions might 
demonstrate the false promise (or, at least, the narrow scope) of these two 
union functions. But the core recognized roles of unions are to protect 
workers from their bosses and to serve as political advocates for their 
members. Police union critics have identified those functions and they 
have framed those functions as fundamentally objectionable.159 
B. Other Unpopular Unions 
One of the primary goals of this Essay is to stress the ways in which 
common critiques of police unions sound uncomfortably like anti-union 
arguments in other sectors.160 This section identifies those parallels. Despite 
their strength relative to private-sector unions,161 public-sector unions have 
been under increasing attack over the course of the past decade.162 States 
have passed “right to work” laws that prevent unions from requiring that 
all represented workers pay dues.163 Union opponents have pursued a 
range of creative litigation strategies geared at diminishing the power of 
public-sector unions.164 Many of these attacks have come from the political 
                                                                                                                           
 158. Some scholars have offered a slightly different account of police unions’ functions: 
“Police unions also have two functions of specific significance, on working conditions and 
on discipline cases. It is the second function that places the police unions apart from 
conventional unions.” Jan Berry, Greg O’Connor, Maurice Punch & Paul Wilson, Strange 
Union: Changing Patterns of Reform, Representation, and Unionization in Policing, 9 
Police Prac. & Res. 113, 114 (2008). 
 159. See supra Part I. 
 160. Cf. Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association 
Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1023, 1076 (2013) (“Left-wing 
critics of police and prison guards’ unions criticize these unions’ support for punitive 
incarceration policies, just as right-wing critics of teachers’ unions blame them for the 
failures of the public schools.”). 
 161. Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 133, at 1140 (“While private sector 
union density has plummeted, public sector unionism has grown—to roughly 40% of the 
public workforce.”). 
 162. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Public Unions Under First Amendment Fire, 95 Wash. U. 
L. Rev. 1291, 1292–93 (2018). 
 163. See Courtlyn G. Roser-Jones, Reconciling Agency Fee Doctrine, the First 
Amendment, and the Modern Public Sector Union, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 597, 635 (2018) 
(“Aside from ‘right to work’ states, which prohibit all agency fee agreements in both the 
private and public sectors, states have limited agency fee rights and their influence on 
political activity through a variety of other statutory forms.”); Right to Work States, Nat’l 
Right to Work Legal Def. Found., http://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-states [https:// 
perma.cc/M8JK-EX4D] (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (collecting state statutes). 
 164. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2461 (2018) (“[Petitioner] Janus refused to join the Union because he opposes ‘many 
of the public policies that [it] advocates,’ including the positions it takes in collective 
bargaining.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 
18a, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-466))); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. 
Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam). 
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right.165 Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, Ohio Governor John Kasich, 
and a range of other Republican politicians pushed “right to work” laws 
and other regulations that they identified as both addressing state budget 
crises and protecting the rights of anti-union workers.166 
These recent moves are far from unprecedented. “Civil service reform” 
and fights between public-sector employers and their workers have 
recurred historically as defining features of public discourse regarding 
unions and their social function.167 The specter of highly compensated or 
powerful workers thwarting the public interest has long made public-
sector unions both controversial and distinct from private-sector unions. 
As President Franklin Delano Roosevelt argued in a 1937 letter, “A strike 
of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to 
obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied. 
Such action, looking toward the paralysis of government by those who have 
sworn to support it is unthinkable and intolerable.”168 To what extent 
Roosevelt actually opposed public-sector organizing remains a point of 
historical debate,169 but skepticism about public-sector unions has remained 
widespread.170 Given that “[p]ublic sector unionism had become the 
vibrant component of the American labor movement,”171 this skepticism 
takes on a major role in the discourse surrounding contemporary labor 
policy. 
                                                                                                                           
 165. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, 1079 
(2014) (describing “a burgeoning Republican ‘right to work’ movement”). 
 166. See, e.g., Patrick Marley, State Workers Willing to Bend on Concessions, Not 
Bargaining Rights, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Feb. 14, 2011), http://archive.jsonline.com/ 
news/statepolitics/116162704.html [https://perma.cc/2AP8-9G42]; Jim Provance, Gov. 
Kasich Delivers Statehouse Speech to Lawmakers, Hecklers, Blade (Mar. 8, 2011), available 
at 2011 WLNR 4535449 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 167. See, e.g., Joseph E. Slater, Public Workers: Government Employee Unions, the 
Law, and the State, 1900–1962, at 17 (2004). 
 168. Isadore Vogel, What About the Rights of the Public Employee?, 1 Lab. L.J. 604, 
612 (1950) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt 
to L.C. Stewart, President, Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. (Aug. 16, 1937)). 
 169. Fischl, Running the Government, supra note 23, at 65 (“As I read the letter, 
Roosevelt is indeed quite clear about his opposition to strikes by public employees, but his 
position on collective bargaining seems to me to be more nuanced than the sound-bite 
version suggests.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Joseph A. McCartin, Unexpected Convergence: Values, Assumptions, and 
the Right to Strike in Public and Private Sectors, 1945–2005, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 727, 733 
(2009) (“In the immediate aftermath of World War II there was no sign that this broad 
animus toward public sector unionization or strikes would abate any time soon.”); Joseph 
Slater, Homeland Security vs. Workers’ Rights? What the Federal Government Should Learn 
from History and Experience, and Why, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 295, 327 (2004) (noting 
widespread resistance toward public-sector collective bargaining during the 1940s and 
1950s). 
 171. Freeman & Ichniowski, supra note 7, at 1. 
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While more recent strikes by teachers’ unions have met with greater 
support from some corners of the U.S. left,172 it is important to recognize 
the widespread hostility to teachers’ unions that—up until quite recently—
had become mainstream within center-left, Democratic, and some pro-
gressive circles.173 The 1990s and early part of the twenty-first century saw 
a growing narrative about education reform that stressed bad teachers and 
an absence of teacher accountability as key obstacles to reform.174 Failing 
schools often were framed as victimizing children from poor communities 
of color; teachers and administrators were the villains—protected by 
unions and unaccountable to parents.175 Despite the fact that teachers’ 
unions often consisted of heavily female membership (often, in large 
cities, with a heavy population of women of color),176 fighting teachers’ 
unions was framed as a civil rights and racial justice cause.177 Indeed, the 
growing popularity of Teach for America among liberals and progressives 
signaled a move to undercut teacher tenure, seniority, and the types of job 
protections associated with teachers’ unions.178 A technocratic preference 
                                                                                                                           
 172. See, e.g., Nick French, A Different Kind of Teachers’ Strike Wave, Jacobin (Mar. 
12, 2019), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/03/a-different-kind-of-teachers-strike-wave 
[https://perma.cc/G4NU-5CY7]; Sarah Jaffe, The Radical Organizing that Paved the Way 
for LA’s Teachers’ Strike, Nation (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/los-
angeles-teachers-strike-utla-organizing-solidarity [https://perma.cc/VV3R-4WZ8]. 
 173. See infra notes 174–175. 
 174. See, e.g., Michelle Rhee, What It Takes to Fix Our Schools: Lessons Learned in 
Washington, D.C., 6 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 39, 52 (2012) (“[Education] reforms all rest on 
the creation of sound, rigorous evaluation systems, and providing constructive and reliable 
feedback is absolutely necessary if we are going to value teachers as professionals and 
increase teacher effectiveness.”); Bill Turque, District Teachers Approve Contract; 
Agreement Expands Rhee’s Power to Fire and Bases Pay on Results, Not Seniority, Wash. 
Post, June 3, 2010 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 175. See, e.g., Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 26, at 629; Waiting for Superman 
(Paramount Pictures 2010) (portraying parent activists fighting to help their children in an 
underfunded public school). 
 176. Megan Dunn & James Walker, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Membership 
in the United States 12 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-membership-in-
the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DLT- 
YASA] (“In local government, women accounted for roughly 6 in 10 union members, 
partially reflecting the large number of women employed as public-school teachers, a highly 
unionized occupation.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Timothy DeLoache Edmonds, Note, Contracting Away Success: The Way 
Teacher Collective Bargaining Agreements Are Undermining the Education of America’s 
Children, 2 Colum. J. Race & L. 199, 238 (2012) (“The effects [of union CBAs] on the 
country’s poor and minority children have been particularly devastating, as they have often 
been subject to the worst that an already strained system has to offer.”); cf. Jonna Perillo, 
Uncivil Rights: Teachers, Unions, and Race in the Battle for School Equity 115 (2012) 
(“[In the 1960s, the] question of whether schools existed for the benefit of students or 
teachers would be all the more relevant, and the relationships between black students and 
white teachers even more central to public discussions of school reform and teacher 
unionism.”). 
 178. See, e.g., Gloria Ladson-Billings, Race . . . to the Top, Again: Comments on the 
Genealogy of Critical Race Theory, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1439, 1456 & n.96 (2011) (describing 
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for recent college students with elite credentials was viewed as a means of 
addressing the structural flaws brought about by the unions.179 
Certainly, an explicitly neoliberal strand in the post-Clinton Democratic 
coalition caused some of that hostility.180 But the hostility also sounds in a 
language of accountability that might have much more to do with an older 
model of good-government liberalism than an explicitly pro-market or pro-
privatization ethos.181 One nationwide poll from September, 2018, found 
that despite broad support for striking public school teachers, teachers’ 
unions were viewed relatively negatively and were seen as a vehicle for 
keeping bad teachers in classrooms: “[S]ix of 10 [Democrats] said 
teachers’ unions make it harder to fire bad teachers. So did three of four 
Republicans.”182 
The literature on public-sector unionism reflects a view—resonant 
with critiques of police unions—that organized public-sector workers are 
able to exert an unusually great amount of pressure in bargaining.183 Part 
of this view stems from the suggestion that public-sector unions have “two 
types of clout”: “While they usually cannot threaten a strike, they can at 
least threaten discontent and noncooperation; and, in addition, they can 
threaten retribution at the polls.”184 Politicians being responsive to voters 
is generally viewed as a democratic good—indeed, that responsiveness is 
at the heart of many of the accountability-based critiques of public-sector 
                                                                                                                           
“Teach For America” as a “neoliberal approach[] to management” and a means of avoiding 
union power); Briana Sprick Schuster, Note, Highly Qualified Teachers: Moving Forward 
from Renee v. Duncan, 49 Harv. J. on Legis. 151, 156 & n.38 (2012) (collecting sources). 
 179. See, e.g., Ladson-Billings, supra note 178, at 1456 & n.96; Schuster, supra note 178, 
at 156 & n.38. 
 180. See, e.g., David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism 33 (2006) (describing the 
rise of neoliberalism in the 1990s); Monica Teixeira de Sousa, The State of Our Unions: 
How President Obama’s Education Reforms Threaten the Working Class, 50 U. Louisville 
L. Rev. 201, 202 (2011) (“President Obama has unleashed, through his education policies, 
a conservative assault on unionized teachers that has very little to do with improving 
education and everything to do with seeking the demise of this nation’s public sector 
unions . . . .”). 
 181. But cf. Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution 
50 (2015) (“[T]he norms and principles of neoliberal rationality do not dictate precise 
economic policy, but rather set out novel ways of conceiving and relating state, society, 
economy, and subject and also inaugurate a new ‘economization’ of heretofore 
noneconomic spheres and endeavors.”). 
 182. Susan Page, Merdie Nzanga & Caroline Simon, Even When Teachers Strike, 
Americans Give Them High Grades, Poll Shows. Unions Fare Worse., USA Today (Sept. 12, 
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/09/12/teachers-union-strike-pay/ 
1227089002 [https://perma.cc/C8SN-5V5S]. 
 183. See, e.g., Neil Fox, PATCO and the Courts: Public Sector Labor Law as Ideology, 
1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 245, 260 (“Wellington and Winter argue that economic conditions in 
the public sector . . . give public sector unions the opportunity to exert undue influence 
over the budget-making process.”). 
 184. Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 133, at 1146. 
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unionism.185 But, in this account, responsiveness to public-sector workers 
is not necessarily a good: These workers represent an “interest group[]” 
that is subverting the proper functioning of democracy.186 
Of course, one commentator’s corrupting “interest group” may well 
be another commentator’s example of Tocquevillian civil society.187 To the 
union sympathizer, “Democratic regimes . . . require some rough sort of 
material and economic equality among their citizens if they are to survive 
as democracies. By moderating the dispersion of earnings and affecting 
the distribution of incomes, unions can assist in maintaining the sorts of 
material conditions necessary to democratic regimes.”188 That is, the very 
properties that make the union an interest group—the pooling of voices 
and the advocacy for a shared, common goal—may well be the very 
characteristics that make it socially desirable. 
Notably, and to this end, a concern about the loss of worker voice has 
been a staple of the sympathetic literature on public-sector unionism. For 
example, in decrying the move to strip power from public-sector unions, 
Michael Fischl argues that the role of worker voice in the public sector is 
essential to preserving the potential for more democratic (private and 
public) workplaces: 
                                                                                                                           
 185. See, e.g., Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Courts, a Protected Bureaucracy, 
and Reinventing Government, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 791, 792 (1995) (“The political power of 
public sector unions makes it unlikely that important changes in civil service rules will be 
adopted . . . .”); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and 
Accountability, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1422, 1442 (2003) (arguing that the existence of public 
sector unions encourages interest group participation in politics). 
 186. See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 185, at 1423 (“[T]here is a danger that 
public actors, even if potentially more successful at pursuing a particular end, will pursue 
socially undesirable ends because of political self-interest.”). Central to such a claim, of 
course, remains the idea that “the public interest” is a thing that is unique and distinct from 
the collected interests of groups of voters. But cf. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation 
of American Law 1780–1860, at 51–52, 63–66 (1977) (recounting the ways in which public 
takings served private interests); Benjamin Levin, American Gangsters: RICO, Criminal 
Syndicates, and Conspiracy Law as Market Control, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 107 
(2013) [hereinafter Levin, American Gangsters] (discussing the private interests advanced 
by public prosecutions). While a discussion of this concept of the “public” falls largely 
outside of the scope of this Essay, the distinction itself strikes me as highly suspect and—
significantly for purposes of this discussion—fundamentally at odds with a vision of unions 
as an important democratic institution. That is, if unions serve to conglomerate the opinions 
of individual workers, they are inherently advancing some set of private interests. If one 
believes that this particular set of amassed private interests (as opposed to, say, other 
collections of private interests, such as corporations) in fact constitutes “the public interest,” 
then the public interest simply becomes a concept contingent upon a certain set of 
normative preferences. 
 187. See supra note 186; see also Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as 
Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 279, 300 (1995) (“[U]nions and the 
institution of collective bargaining can act to reduce the sort of unreflective and ultimately 
enervating dependence on the state and the other large institutions of contemporary life 
that Tocqueville warned would erode the habits a democracy requires.”). 
 188. Kohler, supra note 187, at 301. 
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[U]nions give American workers something that markets and 
employers seldom afford them and that contemporary American 
law does not otherwise provide: a genuine voice in important 
decisions about their work lives and the power to make that voice 
heard. The attack on public-sector unions thus threatens to 
exacerbate what is already a breathtaking “democracy deficit” in 
U.S. labor relations and—should the effort gain traction and 
succeed—to cut American workers altogether out of a role in 
workplace governance.189 
To the extent that calls for accountability bleed into greater demands for 
workplace discipline and more powerful employers,190 “accountability” 
necessarily undermines a normative preference for worker power. If 
accountability to the public comes via employer discipline, then these 
arguments become arguments to empower bosses vis-à-vis their workers.191 
In turn, such a move depends on a belief that those bosses—here, higher 
ranking police and other state actors—will (1) be effective in disciplining 
police and (2) share the values and commitments of activists seeking to 
achieve greater accountability.192 
Interestingly, even though there certainly are other state actors on the 
other side of the bargaining table, the obstructionist accounts or critiques 
section I.A describes tend to focus exclusively on police unions as the 
source of objectionable contractual provisions. Implicitly, there appears to 
be an assumption that were it not for police unions, activists would have 
achieved the desired reforms. Whether that counterfactual is true remains 
an unanswerable empirical question.193 But notably absent from this 
discussion or these critiques tends to be an acknowledgement of the role 
of “management” (e.g., legislators, mayors, etc.) in these labor negotia-
tions. Ignoring management’s place in the bargaining process risks letting 
actual elected officials pass the buck and suggests that it is the job of the 
union—not the elected officials—to look out for the public interest.194 
                                                                                                                           
 189. Fischl, Running the Government, supra note 23, at 40. 
 190. See Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 2265, 2268 
(2018) [hereinafter Levin, Criminal Employment Law] (examining how public support for 
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 191. See id.; cf. Ahmed A. White, My Coworker, My Enemy: Solidarity, Workplace 
Control, and the Class Politics of Title VII, 63 Buff. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (2015) (arguing that 
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 192. Cf. Levin, Criminal Employment Law, supra note 190, at 2316–18 (arguing that 
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 193. It is conceivable that we might be able to examine the policies in jurisdictions 
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would need to account for a range of variables—local politics, the relevant history of police 
violence and police–civilian interactions, and so forth. 
 194. Indeed, some critical accounts of police unions suggest that they have “bullied” 
politicians into enacting pro-police policies or shying away from greater oversight. See, e.g., 
David Firestone, The NYC Police Union Has a Long History of Bullying City Hall, Quartz 
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(Relatedly, such simplified accounts obscure the fact that government 
actors might make concessions on CBA provisions relating to oversight as 
a means of avoiding police demands regarding wages, hours, and benefits.) 
By way of analogy, imagine a municipality with a unionized sanitation 
department. The sanitation workers’ CBA is about to expire, so the union 
and the municipal government enter into collective bargaining. Union 
representatives ask for increased pay and that trash collection days fall only 
once a month, rather than once a week. The government representatives 
are concerned about the municipality’s budget and conclude that the pay 
increase is out of the question. When the union representatives threaten 
a strike or slowdown, the government decides to cave to the union’s 
demand regarding trash collection (because that demand wouldn’t have 
a direct budgetary effect). As one could imagine, the populace would be 
extremely upset with once-monthly trash collection (and there might be a 
public health emergency). 
Whose fault is the limited trash collection? On the one hand, perhaps 
it’s the union’s fault: Certainly, the workers were upset about not getting 
paid more, but the once-a-month demand was unreasonable and ran 
counter to the public interest. Additionally, perhaps sanitation workers 
have expertise that would make them better positioned to appreciate just 
how much trash the municipality produced and how harmful a single-day 
collection would be.195 On the other hand, perhaps it’s the government’s 
fault: Politicians, unlike the workers or union representatives, were elected 
to serve the public interest. Balancing imperfect outcomes is a politician’s 
job, and when politicians choose wrong, the buck stops with them. 
Critiques of teachers’ unions and other public-sector unions often 
sound in the language of democratic failures: Because of union politics 
and the outsized influence of organized labor, democracy has been 
subverted.196 Rather than serving the interests of the community, the 
argument goes, some corner of the public sector has been captured and 
has come to serve the interest of organized labor.197 But this is a highly 
                                                                                                                           
(Dec. 23, 2014), https://qz.com/317338/the-nyc-police-union-has-a-long-history-of-bullying- 
city-hall [https://perma.cc/EQ9L-4GD5]. 
 195. While scholars contest just how much expertise police have, judges and legislators 
tend to invoke police expertise when deferring to officer decisionmaking. See, e.g., Anna 
Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1995, 1997 (2017); 
Josh Segal, Note, ‘All of the Mysticism of Police Expertise’: Legalizing Stop-and-Frisk in New 
York, 1961–1968, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 573, 575 (2012). 
 196. See supra Part I. 
 197. See, e.g., Walker Bragman, The Union Fight that Defined Beto O’Rourke’s City 
Council Days, Intercept (Jan. 13, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/13/beto-o-
rourke-public-sector-unions [https://perma.cc/T3KM-CX4U] (“At the height of the 
conflict, O’Rourke publicly mused about disbanding the police union, calling it ‘out of 
control’ and lamenting his colleagues’ unwillingness to stand up to the powerful political 
force.”). 
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selective application of capture theory198—in other words, it appears to rest 
on a belief that elected officials, absent union pressure, would “do the 
right thing” and be responsive to otherwise powerless constituents. Of 
course, this an empirical question, but the argument seems dubious when 
the constituents in question lack major political clout. If we are willing to 
concede that democracy isn’t pure and that elected officials are influenced 
by powerful interests (a shocking concession, to be sure, but please bear 
with me), then removing public-sector unions would simply mean remov-
ing one of many powerful interest groups. Maybe that would yield good 
outcomes. But the argument driving “education reform” and other anti-
public-sector union efforts appears to rest on a view that the unions, not 
the government actors, are getting it wrong. If the problem truly is a 
democratic one (i.e., poor people, people of color, and others from 
marginalized communities lack meaningful political representation), why 
would that problem evaporate in a world without police unions? 
I return to this relationship among government, union, and polity in 
section IV.B. For the time being, though, I simply wish to stress the ways in 
which the prevalent critiques of police unions sound much like critiques 
of other disfavored or controversial public-sector unions. In the next Part, 
I examine a range of distinctions that might explain why police unions 
could be viewed as exceptional in discussions of organized labor. 
III. WHY IS THIS UNION UNLIKE ALL OTHER UNIONS? 
For union supporters who find themselves embracing critiques of 
police unions, the analysis in the previous Part might be unsettling. Are 
those of us worried about policing actually advancing a set of arguments 
and policy proposals that undercut unionism, particularly public-sector 
unionism? Why don’t arguments for whittling away procedural and 
employment protections for police apply to teachers or other public-sector 
workers? 
Certainly, some readers might enthusiastically say, “They do!” To 
those readers, police unions might operate as a particularly egregious 
example of an otherwise corrupt and objectionable phenomenon—the 
public-sector union. Those readers would embrace the police union 
critiques if applied elsewhere, arguing that the logic of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) simply does not extend to workers who are sup-
posed to serve the public interest. Some of those readers—perhaps, 
adherents to a neoclassical or Chicago School economic model—might 
reject unionization across the board as a form of cartelization hostile to 
                                                                                                                           
 198. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1284 (2006) (describing “capture theory”); Jody Freeman, 
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 555 n.33 (2000) (examining 
“how government can use market mechanisms to solve problems”). 
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efficient markets.199 Others might be more sympathetic to organized labor 
in the private sector, but may view unions as a bad fit in public-sector 
workplaces.200 
But what about scholars who consider themselves supportive of the 
unionization project? Is it possible to embrace the critiques articulated in 
Part I while still retaining a principled justification for public-sector union-
ism?201 And, even if it is, can the critiques themselves be cabined neatly, 
such that they don’t easily migrate to debates about other public-sector 
unions?202 As a formal, doctrinal matter, there certainly are differences 
between police unions and many other public-sector unions.203 But, as 
discussed above, those differences are generally limited in scope and, if 
anything, restrict the rights of police unions as compared to other 
unions.204 
This Part traces a few possible distinguishing features that might set 
police unions apart and allay fears of an unintended endorsement of the 
anti-union playbook. As I argue at greater length in the next Part, it is not 
clear that any of these distinctions does the necessary work. Or, maybe 
more importantly, the distinctions might tell us much more about policing 
(and objections to it) than about unions. 
A. Use of Force 
Perhaps the most obvious and intuitively appealing distinction rests 
on police officers’ ability to use force.205 As one police-union critic puts it, 
“[s]ocial workers and teachers don’t fire bullets into the hearts and heads 
of unarmed people, or impose brute order when social unrest proves too 
                                                                                                                           
 199. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 607, 
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Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 988, 1011 (1984). 
 200. See, e.g., Fischl, Running the Government, supra note 23, at 63–65 (describing 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s views on the incompatibility of unions with public service). 
 201. See John Pfaff (@JohnPfaff), Twitter (Jan. 13, 2019), https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/ 
status/1084558610498310144 [https://perma.cc/T56D-VZ27] (“I understand the challenge 
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 202. Cf. Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion 
Discourse, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1195–97 (2010) (tracking the migration, or co-
optation, of feminist trauma discourse into the basis for antifeminist court decisions 
restricting reproductive rights). 
 203. See supra notes 133–137 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra section II.A. 
 205. See Firestone, supra note 194 (“The members of no other union carry guns in 
public, or are responsible for public safety. Police unions carry a special burden to act in the 
highest interest of the city, but over many decades, no other union has acted less 
responsibly.”). 
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acute for less coercive pacification.”206 Certainly, force is central to the role 
and power of police officers in the United States.207 To the extent we 
conceive of the role of police as preserving or ensuring “order,” “there 
should be little doubt that police secure order through threats of superior 
physical force, and at least sometimes, actual exercises of it.”208 Critically, 
the Supreme Court has consistently condoned the use of force, up to and 
including deadly force, in the context of lawful arrests.209 Put simply, every 
police–civilian encounter carries with it the risk of an officer’s resorting to 
lethal force.210 As agents of the state empowered to act out the official 
monopoly on violence,211 police appear very different from the teacher or 
the bus driver. Because of this monopoly on violence, the reasoning would 
go, police are sui generis (or, at least, fall into a special category with other 
armed agents of the state). 
This distinction is descriptively accurate.212 Police officers go to work 
armed and are told by their superiors and every branch of the government 
that they can use lethal force. The vast majority of other workers have no 
such authority or directive. But is this a distinction without a difference?213 
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 211. See, e.g., Zanita E. Fenton, Disarming State Action; Discharging State Responsibility, 52 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 47, 47–48 (2017) (noting the state’s monopoly on power and 
including law enforcement within that monopoly). 
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of much policing scholarship. See Seth W. Stoughton, Moonlighting: The Private 
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 213. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 
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The best case to be made rests on some form of forfeiture analysis: 
Because police are granted a range of unique powers in society, they must 
give up certain rights in exchange, and society should hold them to a 
higher standard.214 Qualified immunity and constitutional doctrines protect 
police decisionmaking,215 this argument goes, so officers shouldn’t be 
entitled to further protections. Or, in more familiar terms, “with great 
power comes great responsibility.”216 As a practical matter, though, too 
often courts and legislatures appear to take the opposite approach—
holding police officers to a lower standard than they would hold 
civilians.217 
But operationalizing the forfeiture logic is easier said than done. 
What rights should police give up, and how closely related should those 
rights be to their authorization to use force? Should wealthier, stronger, 
or otherwise more privileged workers be stripped of bargaining rights? Or, 
put differently, is our defense of unionization rooted in a vision of an 
otherwise powerless proletariat? There’s certainly a lot of space to reduce 
police powers and to make their legal rights and liabilities more closely 
resemble those of their civilian counterparts. But at what point does 
stripping rights remedy concerns about abusive policing?218 
If the priority in crafting legal rules is reducing police uses of force, 
it’s not clear why eliminating organizing rights is directly responsive. 
Indeed, if we wished to equalize the status of police and other workers, it 
would make much more sense to attempt to chip away at the use of force 
authorization or the other rights that set police above other workers. This 
could be done via qualified immunity reform (an increasingly popular 
intervention),219 by disarming police, or by dramatically reducing their 
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1372 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:1333 
 
rights to use force or arrest.220 That police officers retain these rights and 
advantages might be troubling and might lessen the sense that they need 
the sort of empowerment that union representation affords. But if that’s 
the case, then restricting organizing and bargaining rights simply becomes 
a second-order mechanism for regulating the first-order problem (i.e., 
violence).221 
This observation isn’t to contest the important point that police 
unions influence policy. Unionization strengthens the political power of 
police, and because police are a more powerful lobby, politicians are more 
likely to support pro-police policies that hamper accountability. Since 
politicians support such policies, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
heavily policed communities to have their voices heard and hold officers 
accountable.222 That said, many other second-order regulations might also 
diminish officers’ ability to shape policy: more heavily restricting speech 
rights, diminishing pay, or even gerrymandering to dilute votes in neigh-
borhoods with larger police populations.223 Yet there might be reasons to 
worry about each of those policy proposals. They would harm police, but 
they also drift further away from the first-order problem/regulatory goal 
while potentially diminishing other democratic values. 
Finally, one additionally might argue that the authorization of force 
also should affect the analysis because of what it does to power 
relationships. While this claim rests on a power analysis (much like the 
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forfeiture argument does), the argument is slightly different: To the 
extent that unionization is justified in terms of evening out the power 
imbalances of capitalism, perhaps the use of force already takes care of 
that imbalance. It’s an interesting argument that might intersect with (or, 
perhaps, subvert) a larger literature on gun ownership and inequality,224 
but it doesn’t do much work. Police are authorized to use force against 
civilians in a range of contexts. But the relevant imbalance of power for 
assessing the need for collective bargaining is not the imbalance between 
police and civilians; rather, from a contractual perspective, the “inequality 
of bargaining power” stems from or defines the relationship between workers 
and their bosses.225 So, for force to have significant purchase in a labor 
analysis, that force would need to counteract the inherent power that bosses 
enjoy over workers. While police certainly are granted significant leeway 
in their use of force,226 courts and legislatures hardly have blessed some 
sort of labor violence. Indeed, courts and legislatures are hostile to the 
suggestion that police unions can even strike (i.e., use nonviolent 
economic coercion): Forty-two states and the District of Columbia explic-
itly outlaw police strikes, and only two states allow police union strikes.227 
The authorization to use force certainly is a distinguishing feature of 
U.S. police and differentiates them from other workers and other 
members of society. But that authorization ultimately has little to do with 
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labor organizing or the relative power of labor and management in collec-
tive bargaining. 
B. Police as Bosses or Managers? 
Perhaps another way of distinguishing police unions from other 
unions is the social status of the unionized workers. Unions are hetero-
geneous in politics, interests, and approach, and perhaps the arguments 
raised in Part II suffer from a flattening out of class; that is, just because 
police are workers and police unions are unions doesn’t necessarily mean 
that one need accept that every union or every worker should receive the 
same treatment or bundle of rights.228 If the project at the heart of union-
ization is class consciousness, how do we delineate class or determine how 
to advance solidarity?229 Put simply, class is not so simple; the “working 
class was never the singular social and historical entity suggested by the 
phrase.”230 
In his writings on class consciousness, Marxist theorist Georg Lukács 
recognizes the challenge inherent in such a project: 
[I]s the problem of class consciousness a ‘general’ sociological 
problem or does it mean one thing for the proletariat and 
another for every other class to have emerged hitherto? . . . [I]s 
class consciousness homogeneous in nature and function or can 
we discern different gradations and levels in it? And if so, what 
are their practical implications for the class struggle of the 
proletariat?231 
One response would be that such divisions are hostile to the broader 
project of solidarity and worker empowerment. These divisions, the argument 
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goes, “are pure and simple illusions or, worse, pure and simple impostures, 
milked for all they are worth in the capitalist class struggle against the 
workers’ class struggle for the purpose of maintaining workers in the 
condition of the exploited.”232 Class, in this view, operates as a sort of 
shorthand. Of course, there are differences among workers with the same 
income or the same education, but by invoking the concept of “class,” 
scholars and union advocates are necessarily smoothing out those 
distinctions.233 
The inter- and intra-industry challenge of addressing heterogeneity is 
not simply a theoretical problem; rather, it stands at the heart of the 
workplace’s legal architecture. U.S. labor and employment laws distin-
guish among classes of workers,234 affording different rights and causes of 
action to different groups depending on their status in labor markets or 
production chains.235 While these legal frameworks may fail to protect the 
interests of particularly marginalized workers (e.g., temporary workers or 
contractors),236 they generally protect the rights of lower wage/status 
workers, rather than the rights of bosses, managers, or some professional 
workers.237 
                                                                                                                           
 232. Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses 35–36 (G.M. Goshgarian trans., Verso 2014) (1971); see also Robinson, 
supra note 230, at 42 (“[T]he dialectic of prolitarianization disciplined the working classes 
to the importance of distinctions . . . . The persistence and creation of such oppositions 
within the working classes were a critical aspect of the triumph of capitalism in the 
nineteenth century.”). 
 233. Cf. Flora Tristan, The Workers’ Union 39–41 (Beverly Livingston trans., Univ. of 
Ill. Press 1983) (1843) (advocating for a more capacious class solidarity via sweeping 
unionization). 
 234. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944) (distinguishing 
“employees” and “independent contractors” as different classes of workers); Frito-Lay, 
Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1013 (1973) (identifying geographic and control–autonomy 
distinctions). 
 235. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: 
Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 251 (2006) (describing legal approaches to regulating precarious 
and liminal labor markets). 
 236. See, e.g., V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of 
Legal Worker Identities, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 65, 89–95 (2017) (describing the legal hurdles 
facing workers who don’t fall easily into specific categories); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment 
Law as Labor Law, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2685, 2698–99 (2008) (describing how the NLRA fails 
to cover independent contractors). 
 237. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974) (concluding that 
the NLRA does not cover managerial employees); Marion G. Crain, Building Solidarity 
Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A Blueprint for Worker Empowerment, 74 Minn. 
L. Rev. 953, 959 (1990) (noting “the exclusion of middle-level employees from NLRA 
coverage”); Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness 
and Transformative Politics, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937, 943 (2007) (“[C]ourts issued decisions 
defining the scope of the bargaining unit to exclude ‘managerial employees.’” (quoting 
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980))); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing 
Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1775, 
1794–96 (1989) (discussing the managerial exclusions derived from ambiguous Taft–
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In the legal academic literature and public debates on policing, there 
is a troubling tendency to erase institutional hierarchies and elide all 
classes of police, such that the beat cop is the same as the detective, is the 
same as the investigator, is the same as the chief.238 This flattening is a 
problem because it erases the workplace realities of policing: Everyone is 
not similarly situated, orders are given and taken, and some law enforce-
ment actors are more responsible for policy and institutional decisionmak-
ing than others.239 From the perspective of a union proponent, such a 
flattening might be beneficial as a means of building class consciousness 
or a “culture of solidarity” across internal institutional divisions.240 For 
union critics, though, precision should be important in diagnosing who or 
what is so problematic about police unions: Who are the actors responsible 
for enacting problematic policies, who are the actors most likely to have 
working relationships with civilians, and who are the actors best positioned 
to impose internal discipline and accountability?241 
Even accepting that police departments are fiercely hierarchical, 
police (even those with the lowest departmental status) might still be 
viewed as representing the interests of bosses—i.e., the forces of capital—
rather than labor. In other words, the concern at the heart of police union 
critiques is not focused on internal labor dynamics at all; instead, the focus 
is on the broader place of police in the U.S. political economy. In the res-
olution seeking the expulsion of police unions from the AFL-CIO, this 
critique rears its head: 
While it is true that police are workers, and thus hypothetically 
subject to the same kinds of exploitation as other laborers, they 
are also the militarized, coercive arm of the state. It is the job of 
the police to protect capital and, consequently, maintain class 
                                                                                                                           
Hartley provisions); Donna Sockell, The Future of Labor Law: A Mismatch Between 
Statutory Interpretation and Industrial Reality?, 30 B.C. L. Rev. 987, 992–93 (1989) 
(discussing “the complexities of drawing distinctions among individuals eligible and 
ineligible for [NLRA] coverage”). 
 238. But cf. Tracy Meares & Tom Tyler, Policing: A Model for the Twenty-First Century, 
in Policing the Black Man: Arrest, Prosecution, and Imprisonment 161, 173 (Angela J. Davis 
ed., 2017) (“[P]olice officers want from their commanders the same sort of fairness that the 
public wants from them. And . . . officers often feel they do not receive their due even in 
their own station houses. Hence, it is also important to rethink the organization of police 
forces . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 239. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 722 (“Police departments are hierarchical, 
with a chain of command as in the military and a sharp division between the leadership and 
the rank-and-file.” (footnote omitted)). 
 240. See generally Fantasia, supra note 229, at 24 (“The location of, and the possibilities 
for, worker mobilization and collective action today have been profoundly shaped by 
previous struggles, processes, and initiatives, and it is by understanding this changing terrain 
that contemporary cultures of solidarity can be properly situated.”). 
 241. Such a nuanced approach would be responsive to the growing critique that 
accounts of criminal justice policy suffer from “insufficient concentration on diverse actors 
and conflict.” Philip Goodman, Joshua Page & Michelle Phelps, Breaking the Pendulum: 
The Long Struggle over Criminal Justice 7 (2017). 
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society. How can there ever be solidarity between law 
enforcement and the working class when elites call upon police 
and their organizations to quell mass resistance to poverty and 
inequality? The police force exists solely to uphold the status quo. 
Their material survival depends on it, and they hold a vested 
interest in the preservation and expansion of the most 
deplorable practices of the state.242 
In seeking to disown police unions or expel them from the labor move-
ment, critics have argued that police unions never were a part of the labor 
movement: Historically, organized police served to brutalize and impede 
the progress of workers.243 Or, as a Jacobin editor argues, the “inherent 
defect of law enforcement unionism” remains that “[i]t’s peopled by those 
with a material interest in maintaining and enlarging the state’s most 
indefensible practices.”244 The claim isn’t that officers are bosses in the 
sense of the literal boss–worker dialectic. Rather, it’s that police are the 
tools of capital, of bosses, and of antiworker structures of power.245 
Some sort of claim that police unions are inextricable from the 
violence of capitalism (or, capital’s violence against labor) gets us closer 
to an argument for police abolition.246 I will put a pin in that discussion—
the broader question of whether policing is a desirable social institution—
for the moment and return to it in the next Part.247 But I worry about this 
framing of police unions in which the unions represent capital and hierar-
chy, while (apparently) all other unions represent labor and a resistance 
to hierarchy. 
First, as discussed above,248 such a move flattens out internal police 
hierarchies and seems to take for granted that because an institution or 
industry (here, the police) is hierarchical or politically problematic, then 
internal hierarchies or abuses within the institution shouldn’t be concern-
ing.249 That is, does adopting an abolitionist approach necessarily mean 
                                                                                                                           
 242. Letter from United Auto Workers Local 2865 to AFL-CIO, supra note 47. 
 243. See id. (“Police unions in particular emerge out of a long history of police 
intervention in labor politics and its complicity in racial violence.”). 
 244. Gude, The Bad Kind of Unionism, supra note 63; see also Jon Ben-Menachem 
(@jbenmenachem), Twitter (Jan. 13, 2019), https://twitter.com/jbenmenachem/status/ 
1084490021950902273 [https://perma.cc/U9QV-D35Q] (“I’d argue that police unions 
shouldn’t be considered ‘public sector unions,’ because they perpetuate class inequity.”). 
 245. Contrary to this narrative of police unions as inherently hostile to other forms of 
organized labor, it is worth noting that early police unionization efforts met with substantial 
resistance because “business and anti-labor groups feared that unionized police would strike 
and, more important, would not stop other employees from striking and picketing.” Fisk & 
Richardson, supra note 12, at 735. 
 246. See Vitale, The End of Policing, supra note 107, at 228 (describing police as a 
key feature and defender of “intertwined systems of oppression”). 
 247. See infra section IV.B. 
 248. See supra notes 238–239 and accompanying text. 
 249. Notably, while the contemporary discourse on police unions tends to focus on 
public oversight, unionization initially stemmed from concerns about internal hierarchy. 
See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 734 (“Police officers in many cities began joining 
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rejecting concerns about internal, institutional mistreatment? Does 
embracing abolition mean concluding that beat cops shouldn’t be able to 
file a Title VII claim against their employers or grieve if they aren’t paid 
for overtime? By way of analogy, one certainly could adopt a prison 
abolitionist ethic,250 while recognizing that correctional officers might be 
treated poorly by their superiors. It strikes me as logically defensible to 
argue that there should be no prison guards, but that as long as there are 
prison guards, they should earn a decent wage, receive decent health 
insurance, or receive protection from abuse at the hands of their employ-
ers.251 (As Part IV demonstrates, though, this observation certainly isn’t 
meant to suggest that abolitionists or, for that matter, reformers, should 
be prioritizing the interests of police or correctional officers.)252 
Additionally, this framing of police and focus on relative power 
understates the ways in which other workers—particularly public-sector 
workers—may exercise power or retain various hierarchical advantages 
over other workers or other members of the polity. Take the example of 
teachers’ unions. To sympathetic commentators, the teachers’ union 
might be a necessary vehicle for underpaid, overworked public servants to 
retain some dignity and advocate for their interests.253 Those accounts 
might stress low teacher salaries or the demographics of public school 
teachers, with an eye to race and gender.254 In these accounts, teachers are 
invaluable public servants who have been undervalued and mistreated. To 
unsympathetic commentators on the left and right, though, the teachers’ 
                                                                                                                           
unions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when workers in every industry 
unionized, and for the same reasons—to improve pay and working conditions and to gain 
some measure of control over their work lives.”). 
 250. See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 
1156, 1161–62 (2015) [hereinafter McLeod, Prison Abolition] (“By a ‘prison abolitionist 
ethic,’ I . . . invoke . . . a moral orientation elaborated in an existing body of abolitionist 
writings and nascent social movement efforts, which are committed to ending the practice 
of confining people in cages and eliminating the control of human beings through . . . 
threatened police use of violent force.”). 
 251. There remains, of course, a question of political capital, resources, etc. Scholars, 
advocates, and politicians can’t cure all of the world’s ills and do not have the capacity to 
take on and remedy every injustice. In a universe of scarce resources, then, why advocate for 
the rights of the relatively powerful? That’s a fair question, and one that I have begun to 
address elsewhere. See Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 491, 545–46 (2019); see also supra note 218 and accompanying text. But 
whether advancing police labor rights is a worthwhile goal is a very different question from 
whether police should have labor rights at all. I take most scholarly and popular commentary 
to be focusing much more on the latter than the former. 
 252. See infra notes 345–351. 
 253. See Marion C. Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor Unions, Solidarity, and Money, 22 
Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 259, 291–94 (2018) (collecting sources). 
 254. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, 2 in 3 Americans Say Public School Teachers Are Underpaid, 
Wash. Post (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/two-in-
three-americans-say-public-school-teachers-are-underpaid/2018/08/27/cddf5b6a-a953-11e8 
-b1da-ff7faa680710_story.html?utm_term=.64b2d14d917e (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); Page et al., supra note 182. 
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union starts to look more like a management union.255 If students (particu-
larly students from underserved or marginalized communities) are the 
primary point of empathy, identification, or concern, then teachers are 
only meaningful in that they advance the interests of the student. To the 
extent they don’t, then they are yet another set of (relatively) powerful actors 
complicit in the subordination of powerless young people. As a cog in a 
dysfunctional education system and—perhaps—the school-to-prison 
pipeline, the teacher might be viewed as a bully, an authoritarian, and even 
analogous to a police officer. 
There’s no denying that police (and, by extension, police unions) 
have an ugly history of suppressing labor and of complicity with the vio-
lence of capital and of white supremacy.256 But, as Part IV discusses, how 
much of support for unionization and worker organizing does or should 
rest on a belief that the job in question is socially desirable? Should the 
Mine Workers’ Union be less deserving of political or theoretical support 
because its members’ work contributes to the fossil fuel industry and 
attendant environmental harm? 
C. Nature of Bargaining Power 
Related to the previous argument, perhaps we might simply 
distinguish police unions because of their relative bargaining power or 
social status. As police labor leaders have noted, police unions occupy a 
peculiar place because police are much better off than most workers.257 
The police labor movement has been a success: “As a result of collective 
bargaining rights . . . and political activism among police unions, officers 
are for the most part well-compensated. Salaries in many urban areas 
exceed $100,000, where the central department and suburbs must keep 
up with each other in order to recruit the most qualified candidates.”258 
This success, though, operates as a double-edged sword. “No one should 
begrudge law enforcement officers these benefits and job protections,” 
the union leaders argue.259 But those benefits are not without costs: 
                                                                                                                           
 255. See supra section II.B.; see also Thaddeus Russell (@ThaddeusRussell), Twitter 
(Jan. 14, 2019), https://twitter.com/ThaddeusRussell/status/1084900565484679171 [https:// 
perma.cc/ZUD5-YS2P] (“My teachers in Oakland were petty authoritarians who knew 
nothing about me and tracked me into remedial English. I learned nothing from them. 
They were glorified prison guards. My son and I feel the same about his [striking] teachers 
in LA. Please don’t stand with them.”). 
 256. See Donner, supra note 110, at 1 (“[Police units] have, beginning in the Gilded 
Age, predominantly engaged in political repression, which in the context of policing, may 
be defined as police behavior motivated of influenced in whole or in part by . . . activities 
perceived as a threat to the status quo.”); Vitale, The End of Policing, supra note 107, at 40 
(“In some cases, early police forces were created specifically for the purpose of suppressing 
workers’ movements.”). 
 257. See Ron DeLord et al., supra note 73, at x. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
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The problem is that police officers are well-entrenched in the 
middle class, outdistancing many other workers in the community 
who don’t receive the array of benefits and protections that 
officers do. Police unions must depend on public support for 
their pursuit of better wages and benefits; and support becomes 
more difficult when other workers in the community make 
considerably less in wages; pay high monthly premiums for 
substandard health insurance; and are struggling for economic 
survival.260 
Police officers are not only granted a range of legal protections and 
authorized to use force; often, they’re also relatively well-situated in an 
increasingly stratified economy. 
Nevertheless, for their economic status to make much difference, we 
would need to assume that (1) their incomes and relative social status 
make them different from most unionized or unionizing workers, and (2) 
a principled defense of unionism can only defend the rights of the most 
marginalized workers.261 The first point appears debatable, at best. Since 
the high-water mark of U.S. unionization in the wake of the Second World 
War, the largest growth sector for organized labor has been among white-
collar workers, particularly within the public sector.262 Certainly, salaries, 
benefits, and social status of “white-collar” workers vary dramatically. But 
any suggestion that unions exist only in particularly low-wage service 
sectors would appear to be empirically unfounded.263 
The next Part discusses the second point at greater length.264 Never-
theless, for the time being, it is worth noting that a class-conscious politics 
or theoretical defense of unionism generally doesn’t depend upon a work-
force that is the absolute poorest or most socially marginal. Certainly, 
there are many compelling historical examples that sound more like this 
extreme—from the United Farm Workers,265 to more recent work by the 
                                                                                                                           
 260. Id. 
 261. As discussed in the previous section, there might be another possibility: that police 
had effectively eliminated the distinction between boss and worker and therefore become 
capital. I certainly can imagine a sliding scale of enthusiasm for unions or unionization, 
where they appear more vital the greater the power imbalance between boss and worker, 
and less vital the smaller the imbalance. But, to the extent one accepts the justifications of 
unionization common in the literature, I’m not sure why unions are necessarily a problem 
at the “less inequality” end of the spectrum. Further, mapping work relationships on a 
spectrum is easier said than done, and it’s not clear exactly where police would fall (or, 
whether all officers in all departments or jurisdictions would fall in the same place). 
 262. See Michael Denning, Culture in the Age of Three Worlds 231 (2004). 
 263. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 1, at 7–10 tbls.3 & 4 
(showing that unionization and wage rates do not correlate). 
 264. See infra section IV.A.2. 
 265. See The Rise of the UFW, United Farm Workers, https://ufw.org/research/history/ 
ufw-history [https://perma.cc/RD99-5J5M] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020) (“[California’s long 
exploited] farmworkers had tried but failed so many times to organize the giant agribusiness 
farms that most observers considered it a hopeless task. And yet by the . . . [the mid-1970s] 
more than 50,000 farmworkers were protected by union contracts.”). 
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Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in its “Justice for Janitors” 
campaigns.266 And unions hardly are (or have been) the voice of the 
rich.267 But it would be ahistorical to claim that the U.S. labor movement 
had revolved exclusively around the lowest-paid or most socially marginal-
ized workers.268 Indeed, some of the great labor “success stories” involve 
unions that effectively created the post-World War II middle class.269 
All of which is to say that a theory of unionization that rests on an 
image of the most marginal worker needs to grapple with the reality of the 
U.S. labor market. Are higher-skill, higher-wage sectors in which unions 
retain great power (professional sports, entertainment, certain sectors of 
construction) undesirable outliers?270 Or, should these sectors serve as a 
model for more of the workforce and the U.S. economy? Do unions have 
a meaningful role to play when the organizing workers are already rela-
tively well off, or, at least, are not struggling with immediate hunger or 
eviction? 
In some sense, these questions cut to the heart of what “solidarity” 
means and how capacious it should be as a concept for those who study 
labor. Imagining an expansive version of solidarity might speak to ties 
among workers regardless of class—the bargaining or legal victory for 
professional football players might redound to the benefit of fast food 
                                                                                                                           
 266. For more information about “Justice for Janitors,” see Stephen Lerner & Jono 
Shaffer, 25 Years Later: Lessons from the Organizers of Justice for Janitors, Nation (June 16, 
2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/25-years-later-lessons-from-the-organizers- 
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 267. See Sachs, Unbundled Union, supra note 13, at 168 n.83 (“As of March 2011, 
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 268. See, e.g., id. at 168–69 (collecting data on historical unionization rates and discuss-
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Consequences, and the Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 1637, 1640 
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David Ng, Hollywood Guilds Flex Their Muscle as Union Influence Declines Nationwide, 
L.A. Times (May 9, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-hollywood-
unions-20170509-story.html [https://perma.cc/6A7J-HMGZ] (“As union membership 
continues to decline nationwide, Hollywood remains a bastion of organized labor, with 
unions controlling nearly every aspect of production, including the director who calls 
‘action’ and the truck drivers who transport equipment to and from sets. Their power can 
bring the film . . . industry to a standstill . . . .”); see also Sports Unions Work to Level the 
Playing Field, Am. Postal Workers Union (June 30, 2009), https://apwu.org/news/sports-
unions-work-level-playing-field [https://perma.cc/3Y46-95DN] (“Although their average 
salary is considerably higher and their ‘work year’ is much shorter, members of the nation’s 
four major sports unions share much in common with their counterparts in other industries, 
especially the historical basis for their creation: Poor wages and unfair working 
conditions.”). 
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workers. In contrast, narrowing the meaning of solidarity would get us 
back to the distinctions described by Lukács—the rich organizing to 
increase their salaries does little to help the plight of many poor workers.271 
Indeed, perhaps if the public comes to associate “organized labor” only 
with celebrities, then they will be less sympathetic to organized labor 
generally and will come to view unions as inessential. 
Whatever one’s views on the social benefits of or theoretical case for 
higher-wage unions, it’s important to recognize that arguments against 
middle-class (or upper-class) unions cut much more broadly than discus-
sions of police. So, for those who are skeptics of police unions as a result 
of their relatively higher wages and social standing, the real question is 
whether they would adopt similar critiques of autoworkers and other 
middle-class unionized work forces. 
D. Demographics and Politics 
Finally, we might distinguish police unions along lines of member 
politics and demographics. That is, as noted at the outset of the Essay, 
police unions are more likely to swing right politically and may be more 
heavily comprised of white men than some other public-sector unions, 
such as teachers’ unions.272 For this distinction to have any teeth, though, 
our belief in or defense of public-sector unions would need to rest on these 
factors. If, for example, unionization were not viewed as a good in itself, 
but were only desirable to the extent it benefitted workers of color or 
advanced liberal, progressive, or left politics, then we might be right to 
look askance at a union that did none of those things. In other words, this 
critique rests on a view that unionization is not a good in and of itself; 
rather, unionization’s virtues are tied up in a particular understanding of 
unions elevating the voices of left-leaning people and people of color. 
While some union supporters might take that view, it is largely 
ahistorical (or, at least, selectively accurate historically). Unions’ relation-
ships to racial justice have been fraught. The image of unions heavily 
comprised of people of color (particularly Latinx workers) is a relatively 
recent one. Organized labor in the United States often butted heads with 
racial justice advocates. While radical unions such as the Industrial Workers 
of the World (IWW) embraced an explicitly antiracist agenda,273 more 
mainstream unions have, from time to time, embraced or mobilized racist 
                                                                                                                           
 271. See supra notes 231–237 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 172–177 and accompanying text. 
 273. See, e.g., Peter Cole, Wobblies on the Waterfront: Interracial Unionism in 
Progressive-Era Philadelphia 72 (2007); Howard Kimeldorf, Battling for American Labor: 
Wobblies, Craft Workers, and the Making of the Union Movement 72 (1999) (describing 
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and xenophobic policies in order to protect their members’ interests and 
retain market control.274 
Even when unions weren’t outright hostile to the fight for racial 
equality, they certainly weren’t always on the frontlines. The widely cited 
Supreme Court case of Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community 
Organization stands as but one marker of the fraught relationship between 
unions and racial justice.275 In Emporium Capwell, several black workers at 
a unionized San Francisco department store complained to union officials 
that management was discriminating based on race.276 When workers 
found the union’s response unsatisfactory, they picketed in an effort to 
exert pressure on management.277 Eventually, when the workers refused 
to stop picketing, they were fired, leading to litigation.278 This reflected 
“the crisis that liberalism found itself mired in at the end of the 1960s as it 
sought to accommodate its constituents’ disparate visions of economic 
equality and social fairness.”279 The union hadn’t adopted a position 
explicitly opposed to racial justice or civil rights. Indeed, the union was 
pursuing the workers’ grievances. But it had refused to embrace a more 
radical vision that would have allowed workers to confront management 
directly. The case, therefore, became: 
[A] symbol of how labor unions have interacted with community 
groups, often to the detriment of the movement itself. When 
community groups have sought to involve themselves in unions, 
they have found an ideology that is partly driven by law but partly 
rooted in notions of hierarchy and the legal entitlement to 
exclusively speak for workers.280 
                                                                                                                           
 274. See, e.g., Philip S. Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619–1981, at 
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1135, 1149–51 (2013) (critiquing a reading of Emporium Capwell as emblematic of deeper 
racism in organized labor). 
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To be clear, the relationship between movements for worker power 
and for racial justice resists easy classification. “The labor movement” is—
and always has been—far from monolithic,281 and the same is true of 
marginalized groups or movements for racial justice.282 Further, the 
temptation to speak of “race,” “class,” and other identities as distinct 
misstates the interconnectedness and interdependency of various hierar-
chies.283 Much ink has been spilled and competing narratives abound on 
organized labor and race in the United States. Some commentators focus 
on the ways that unions worked to exclude people of color from the labor 
market,284 while others argue that unions have been an important vehicle 
for civil rights.285 Rather than endorsing one narrative here, I simply mean 
to emphasize that the question of unions and race is a complicated one. 
Suggesting that the operative justification for worker organizing or labor 
law was to advance the interests of racial justice seems highly contestable. 
So a critique of police unions that relies on an image of otherwise racially 
unproblematic unionism is misguided or, at least, in need of much greater 
                                                                                                                           
 281. See Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America: Race, Economic Policy, 
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Identity 14 (Taylor & Francis e-Library ed. 2002) (“[W]omen are the sex which is not ‘one,’ 
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politics, and to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous. But to neglect the racial 
factor as merely incidental [i]s an error only less grave than to make it fundamental.”). 
 284. See, e.g., Paul Frymer, Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, 
and the Decline of the Democratic Party 1–8 (2008); Herbert Hill, Black Labor and the 
American Legal System: Race, Work, and the Law 100–01 (1977) (“The legislation intended 
to be the keystone of President Roosevelt’s program to protect and uplift the working class 
had already become a millstone around the black worker’s neck . . . .”); Marion Crain, 
Whitewashed Labor Law, Skinwalking Unions, 23 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 211, 213 
(2002). 
 285. See, e.g., Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1313, 1341 (2002) 
(embracing a vision of “race-conscious labor organizing”); Garden & Leong, supra note 
280, at 1139 (“Like much conventional wisdom, the pervasive narratives describing unions 
and people of color as rivals are flawed.”); James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions 
and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 Tex. 
L. Rev. 889, 903 (1991). 
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explanation. If organizations that in some way reinforced the interests of 
(some version of) white masculinity or heteropatriarchy were inherently 
problematic, then many other unions—both contemporary and histori-
cal—should be subject to similar criticism as police unions. 
Similarly, unions have not been uniformly left, liberal, progressive, or 
Democratic. Even if we (accurately) view unionization as an inherently left 
project,286 unions have not uniformly embraced left political views or 
supported left-leaning politicians. In his controversial, but well-received 
history of the Teamsters, Thaddeus Russell argues that famed Teamsters 
President Jimmy Hoffa’s success and leadership strategy owed much more 
to his conservative views and support for right-inflected economic policies, 
than it did to leftist solidarity.287 While Hoffa shared the same basic goal of 
contemporary socialist and social-democratic labor leaders (i.e., “creating 
a monopoly over the labor market”), Russell argues, Hoffa was motivated 
not by “an ideology of worker communitarianism,” but rather “by nothing 
more than the self-interest of an economic rationalist.”288 This isn’t to 
suggest that Hoffa is emblematic of the U.S. labor movement.289 Instead, I 
note Russell’s characterization of Hoffa as a means of illustrating the 
multiplicity of ideals and ideologies that have defined the U.S. labor 
movement. 
Historically, defenses of unionization have rested on an analysis 
rooted in power: Without a union or a means of bargaining and acting 
collectively, workers would exist at the whim of their bosses. This defense 
could rely on a range of different ideological commitments: The Marxist 
might argue that absent unions, labor would be powerless in the face of 
capital;290 the syndicalist might argue that the union represents a superior 
alternative to the state as a vehicle for representing the interests of the 
people;291 for the New Deal liberal, the union is a necessary way of 
protecting some modicum of equality, essential to the functioning of 
                                                                                                                           
 286. That is, unions, by empowering workers and serving as a vehicle for collective voice 
and collective bargaining, level the playing field and alter the terms of an ongoing, systemic 
conflict between labor and capital. 
 287. See Russell, Out of the Jungle, supra note 13, at 212. 
 288. Id. at 109. 
 289. Cf. Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States: 
Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 385, 410 (2006) (“Unions cannot overcome 
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 290. See, e.g., Eric Hobsbawm, How to Change the World: Reflections on Marx and 
Marxism 59 (2011); Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy 187–88 (Harry Quelch trans., 
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 291. See, e.g., Paul Avrich, Anarchist Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in 
America 318, 323 (1995); Michael Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy 90 (Marshall S. Shatz 
ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (1873). 
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democracy and a just society;292 and, even for the conservative or 
libertarian the union might operate as an effective means of aggregating 
worker interests and reaching optimal bargaining outcomes.293 
To conclude that unions are defensible only in so far as they represent 
a certain demographic or set of policy preferences would be to depart 
from each of these traditional, broader justifications. Of course, there is 
nothing wrong with departing from tradition.294 But it is worth noting that 
such a defense of unionization would be a departure and might well 
suggest a different model of the union—more as a political party than a 
bargaining unit. Framed in its most generous (or radical) way, we might 
see this vision as reflecting aspects of IWW-style ideological unionization—
i.e., unionization that reflected a broader political project or set of 
commitments to class solidarity and political radicalism. Think here of the 
call for one big union295 as a means for the forces of labor to engage in 
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open economic warfare with the forces of capital.296 To supporters of a 
more radical unionism, perhaps this model would represent a marked 
improvement over the stale and “ossified” models of worker empower-
ment that are on their last legs. 
But, there is a key difference between the radical unionist model and 
the contemporary model: The former is rooted in a radical ideology that 
identified class solidarity and empowerment as the end goals; the contem-
porary model appears to rest more on a set of liberal/progressive commit-
ments that align more with a political party than a class or social group. To 
the Wobblies,297 workers rising up and fighting capital might well have 
been an end in itself, or, at least, a means to a world in which labor had 
overthrown or unseated capital. To the contemporary advocates for union 
as political actor, the end appears to be electoral victory for Democrats or 
progressive candidates and the attendant adoption of policies favored by 
those candidates. Those policies certainly might benefit working people 
and might be better than the alternative. But it would be a stretch to argue 
that the vision is similarly radical or transformative and/or that its 
proponents are imagining a world in which the union might become the 
relevant unit of social and political ordering. Or, maybe more accurately, 
to some proponents of this vision, it might be deeply radical or transforma-
tive. Yet, unlike an IWW-style radical union model, the radicalism and 
transformation are not explicitly grounded in class warfare and the 
conflict between labor and capital. 
IV. A PROBLEM OF UNIONS, OR A PROBLEM OF POLICING? 
To the extent any or all of the distinctions discussed in the previous 
Part resonate, perhaps we needn’t delve deeper into the distinction between 
police unions and other public-sector unions. Perhaps there is a principled 
theoretical distinction that might allow scholars and activists to endorse 
stripping police of union rights while continuing to advocate for public-
sector unions. Perhaps. But I’m not convinced. 
Instead, in this Part, I argue that we might identify different strands 
in the critical literature on police unions. The first strand is, at its core, a 
critique of public-sector unions. For a variety of reasons, police unions 
might be a particularly objectionable form of public-sector union. But the 
true vice of police unions is their very union-ness—the very properties 
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discussed in Part II. The second strand actually has relatively little to say 
about the unions themselves. Rather, this strand—finding perhaps its 
strongest voice in the growing literature on police abolitionism—is at its 
core a critique of police. Certainly, to these critics, police unions are objec-
tionable. But they are objectionable because they represent a consolida-
tion of otherwise- or already-illegitimate power. The problem is police. 
Police unions are an important lever of power in policing reform. And, 
given the challenges inherent in addressing judicial protections for police, 
perhaps police unions are the right lever on which reformers should focus 
their attention. But unionization is, in some sense, a distraction from the 
fundamental problem—police. This Part addresses these two strands in 
turn. 
A. Anti-Unionism or Narrow Pro-Unionism 
First, we might understand the prevalent critiques of police unions as 
reflecting a deeper hostility to public-sector unions, or simply a relatively 
narrow vision of unions’ social value. 
1. Anti-Unionism. — Looking at the parallels outlined in Part II, the 
critiques of police unions start to appear quite sweeping. Rather than a 
narrow critique geared toward a particularly problematic profession, they 
operate as a theoretical framework for a broader assault on (public-sector) 
organized labor. Consider the two classes of critique identified in Part I: 
the obstructionist critique and the political critique. Not coincidentally, 
these critiques serve as the rejection of Freeman and Medoff’s “monopoly 
face” and “collective voice/institutional response face.”298 Critics have 
identified “what unions do” and concluded that unions do more harm 
than good. The self-serving qualities of unionization elevate the voices of 
some over the voices of others, subordinating the “public interest” to the 
private interests of the workers.299 
That is, perhaps the problem with police unions is not something 
exceptional or unique to this one class of unions. In trying to suss out the 
distinction between police unions and other types of unions, perhaps what 
actually comes through is that some critics actually might be hostile to the 
unionization process or the role of organizing workers. Through this lens, 
the “voice” function allows for an outsized political footprint. The case of 
police unions stands as a particularly glaring example because of their 
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electoral influence and success in extracting concessions from local 
governments.300 And if unions’ “monopoly” function hampers proper func-
tioning of industry and stymies reform, the police unions—again—serve as 
Exhibit A for this dysfunction. Or, put differently, if one embraces these 
critiques, police unions aren’t unique, some objectionable mutation of an 
otherwise desirable social institution. Rather, police unions demonstrate 
all that’s wrong with the unionization project. 
2. Narrow Pro-Unionism. — One needn’t oppose worker organizing 
outright to harbor some ambivalence about unions. A general preference 
for unions certainly might give way when faced with competing values.301 
More instrumental visions of unionism might allow for opposition to 
unionization that fails to serve the desired ends. Ambivalence could take 
many forms that might bear on police unions. But, here, I focus on an 
ambivalence rooted in a concern about too much collective power. This 
concern is hardly new. Indeed, a historicized treatment of U.S. labor law 
must grapple with the deep uncertainty about worker power that has 
defined even the most pro-union moments in labor law’s development. 
Despite a common view that scholars and commentators on the left view 
unionization as an unqualified good, there’s good reason to believe that 
the reality is much more complicated. 
The history of U.S. organized labor might be understood as reflecting 
a cycle, or perhaps a fluctuation, between two poles: (1) a societal concern 
that organizing workers had too little power and needed protections so 
they could defend themselves against capital, and (2) a societal concern 
that organizing workers had too much power and were endangering the 
proper operation of the economy and causing third-party harms. We can 
see labor law as it has evolved as reflecting those concerns, vacillating 
between expanding and restricting workers’ rights. 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, legal and 
political elites perceived organizing workers as a threat to industry and the 
nation’s fledgling economy, so organizing workers were prosecuted under 
the “labor conspiracy” doctrine.302 Labor law was criminal law, and 
unionization was a crime.303 Fast forward a century, and public opinion 
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had shifted. In the years before the rise of the New Deal and the passage 
of the NLRA, violence against organizing workers captivated the public 
imagination.304 With a nation struggling to make ends meet, capital became 
a villain in much mass culture, and workers seeking to earn a decent wage 
garnered greater sympathy.305 Certainly, there was still significant fear of 
labor radicalism and the “wrong type” of unions, but the increasingly 
accepted public narrative was one of powerful bosses exploiting powerless 
workers.306 So, the NLRA and modern labor law were born. 
Despite the effusive rhetoric that accompanied the passage of the 
NLRA, the pendulum once again swung: Within ten years of the Act’s 
passage, Congress passed the Taft–Hartley Act, which dramatically 
restricted the power of unions.307 As the wartime economy blossomed and 
organized labor grew further entrenched in the manufacturing sector, 
industrial pushback became fierce. Unions were interfering with the smooth 
functioning of the economy, opponents claimed, and they were acting as 
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extortionate forces, exacting unreasonable rents from employers. Add to 
that the Red Scare and elision of unions with Communism, and the union 
was no longer the powerless entity in need of the state’s protections. 
Instead, the specter of real union power proved intimidating, leading to 
the passage of Taft–Hartley and the Labor Management Relations Act, 
which helped “deradicalize” U.S. labor law and defang unions.308 
These shifts in public opinion and legal protections have continued 
in the ensuing decades, even as federal labor law has stagnated or “ossified.”309 
The Reagan-era decimation of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization (PATCO) was rooted in framing the workers as exerting too 
much power—effectively exerting the power to grind travel to a halt.310 
Similarly, shifting perceptions of unions as corrupt or “captured” by 
organized crime led to prosecutions and governmental control of some 
locals.311 And, as discussed above, teachers’ unions have been public 
villains, decried by many, when they were viewed as using their power to 
the detriment of vulnerable students.312 When seen as the powerless 
victims of austerity and harsh politicians, though, sympathies (at least on 
the political left) swung back. 
This is, of course, a grossly oversimplified account of centuries of U.S. 
labor history. But it is meant to illustrate a basic point: Worker power (not 
“workers’ rights” or “worker dignity”) has historically prompted fear, 
concern, and a dialing back of legal protections. Worker power is often 
referred to romantically or idealistically as an unqualified good,313 but 
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when worker power has been wielded, it hasn’t necessarily been met with 
resounding support, particularly from liberals or progressives.314 
There has long been a deep undercurrent in labor law, its public 
understanding, and its scholarly treatments that views unionization as a 
good—to a point. Unions might be important for many reasons, but as an 
aggregation of collective power, they also can be dangerous. This under-
current relies on a view that unions serve as a counterbalance to the forces 
of capital; but when unions obtain too much power they may be as 
dangerous as capital or aggregations of corporate power. From industrial 
sabotage to the secondary boycott, unions might not advance liberal ideals 
or promote social stability.315 Courts have treated exercises of union power 
as possibly portending “general class war.”316 And lawmakers and commen-
tators often frame union power as rooted in the actual or threatened 
exercise of force.317 Despite labor’s long path to legitimacy from the days 
of the nineteenth-century conspiracy prosecutions, the specter of violence 
haunts the rhetorical and legal landscape of labor regulation.318 
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values.”); White, The Crime of Economic Radicalism, supra note 295, at 687 (“[T]he 
concept of sabotage . . . was central to IWW ideology and propaganda, and . . . reflected very 
clearly the union’s resistance to accelerating attempts by employers to assert totalitarian 
control in the workplace.”). 
 316. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 472 (1921); cf. Am. Steel 
Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 205 (1921) (“The name ‘picket’ 
indicated a militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceable persuasion.”). 
 317. See, e.g., Gary Minda, Boycott in America: How Imagination and Ideology Shape 
the Legal Mind 42–47 (1999); Marion Crain & John Inazu, Re-Assembling Labor, 2015 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 1791, 1817 (“Although some labor protests did involve actual violence, judicial 
decisions in those cases often invoked sweeping condemnations of labor picketing itself.”). 
 318. See, e.g., David Witwer, Shadow of the Racketeer: Scandal in Organized Labor 241 
(2009) (describing “the shadow of the racketeer, a menacing depiction of organized labor’s 
power that antiunion forces invoked throughout the postwar era”); Eisenhower Insists on 
End of Blackmail Picket Lines, Chi. Trib., Aug. 7, 1959, at 5 (quoting President Eisenhower 
as advocating for “a law to protect the American people from the gangsters, racketeers, and 
other corrupt elements who have invaded the labor-management field”). 
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Which is to say that a certain squeamishness about powerful unions 
hardly should be surprising. Despite the repeated insistence from police 
union members and police union opponents that police unions are 
different,319 police unions may just be another example of unions in their 
unpopular form: cartels, bullies, or distasteful manifestations of collective 
power. Indeed, in his work on police unions, David Sklansky has suggested 
that the problem with policing reform isn’t unions as such.320 Rather, it is 
that police unionism reflects a particular oppositional vision of organized 
labor.321 This argument is common in much literature on labor law 
reform322—that a less oppositional model would be better for labor and 
capital.323 But it is worth noting that such an argument runs directly 
counter to a long history of radical unionism and accounts of worker 
power that rest on a vision of unions as a means of fighting an economic 
war against capital.324 
To be clear, support for unionization that is less than categorical need 
not reflect a liberal vision of unions. Such qualifications instead might 
come from a radical posture and provide valuable nuance to left accounts 
of labor primacy. Some narrow pro-unionism might properly be under-
stood as a resistance to conservative unionism. But that critique can and 
should cut more broadly than a skepticism about police unions. From a 
more radical perspective, post-NLRA unionism has always been limited as 
a vehicle for transformative class politics.325 It may be that aspects of the 
                                                                                                                           
 319. See DeLord & York, supra note 62, at 11–18 (discussing the differences between 
“police unions and all other public and private sector unions”); supra Part III. 
 320. See Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, supra note 28, at 180–88. 
 321. See id. 
 322. Sklansky does suggest that his argument should be cabined because “the best 
model for workplace democracy in policing may differ . . . from traditional trade unionism.” 
Id. at 180–81. 
 323. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace 
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 753, 953 (1994) 
(describing successful case studies of participatory management); Van Wezel Stone, supra 
note 156, at 168–72. 
 324. This is not to say that radical unionists or left labor scholars have always rejected 
cooperative management structures out of hand. See Karl E. Klare, The Labor–
Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. Rev. 39, 50 (1988) (“[W]orkplace democracy and economic prosperity alike require new 
forms of work organization combining adversary and participatory assumptions, institutions 
and practices.”). But a cooperative, rather than oppositional, approach risks repurposing 
unions as an asset for capital, either crowding out more radical, worker-representative 
unions, or legitimating employers’ practices and decisionmaking. As Veena Dubal puts it, 
“Instead of curtailing the power of capital, they would extend it.” Veena Dubal, Solidarity 
Unionism v. Company Unionism in the Gig Economy, Law & Pol. Econ. (June 18, 2019), 
https://lpeblog.org/2019/06/18/solidarity-unionism-v-company-unionism-in-the-gig-
economy/#more-2535 [https://perma.cc/G37M-2QCP]. 
 325. See Stanley Aronowitz, Introduction to Working Class Hero, at xv (1983) 
(“Even when the CIO mobilized millions of industrial workers in the 1930’s or during the 
explosion of public sector unionism in the 1960’s, labor . . . did not emerge with a new 
strategy capable of making the most of gains at both the organizational and political 
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police union critique resonate with those more moderate, neoliberal, or 
technocratic approaches. Yet, some of the arguments advanced—think of 
those sounding in class solidarity326—might reflect a broader critique of 
U.S. unionism as conservative, insufficiently radical, and actually divorced 
from the ideological and tactical radicalism that have defined the IWW 
and a range of left unions. 
Taking this more radical, narrow unionism as a guide might lead to a 
range of spaces increasingly explored by labor law scholars: the move away 
from exclusive representation, non-union models of organization, and the 
rise of left alt-labor. Notably, such a turn to alt-labor actually resonates with 
some accounts of police unions. Fisk and Richardson, for example, end up 
endorsing a vision of members-only or minority unionism as a way of 
promoting intradepartmental change.327 Minority unionism has long 
enjoyed support in certain corners of the labor law literature—rather than 
embracing an exclusive bargaining model, whereby a majority of workers 
elect a union and that union must represent all of the bargaining unit, a 
minority-union model might allow for a multiplicity of unions in a given 
shop.328 Workers only would be represented by the union if they voted to 
be.329 To Fisk and Richardson, this approach might allow for dissenting 
voices (particularly black officers) to advance policies that might be less 
regressive than those currently associated with police unions.330 
Of course, such an approach rests on a view that current union 
positions don’t represent rank-and-file preferences (or, at least, the prefer-
ences of significant portions of unionized officers).331 Even for those more 
skeptical about the potential for changing police from within, this 
approach might speak to ways in which police unions are emblematic of 
                                                                                                                           
levels.”); cf. Barenberg, Wagner Act, supra note 314, at 1390 (“[Senator Robert] Wagner’s 
quasi-utopian mission was to ‘build[] . . . a co-operative order’ designed to reintegrate a 
class-riven society and to replace or at least legitimate asymmetric power relations.” (quoting 
Robert Wagner, Address on NBC Radio: Industry and Labor 6 (Oct. 18, 1933) (transcript 
available in The Robert Wagner Papers, Georgetown University, at 600 SF 103, Folder 28))). 
 326. See supra section III.B. 
 327. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 720–21. 
 328. See generally Charles J. Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic 
Rights in the American Workplace (2005); Matthew Dimick, Revitalizing Union Democracy: 
Labor Law, Bureaucracy, and Workplace Association, 88 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1, 30–32 (2010) 
(arguing that exclusive representation “precludes an employer from bargaining with a 
minority union”); Catherine L. Fisk & Benjamin I. Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work 
Law, 4 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 857, 868 (2014) (“[W]hatever the arguments for members-only 
bargaining in non-right-to-work states, there are substantially stronger arguments for the 
Board to conclude that section 8(a)(5) [of the NLRA] requires members-only bargaining 
in right-to-work states.”). 
 329. See Morris, supra note 328, at 184. 
 330. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 721. 
 331. Cf. Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, supra note 28, at 180–82 (noting potential 
benefits of rank-and-file-led reforms, while also arguing that “multivalent organizing and 
management-led exercises in participatory decision making could help to change the shape 
of police unionism”). 
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other faults in the labor movement and the dominant model of unionism. 
That is, top–down governance, conservative approaches, and resistance to 
change might be seen as costs of the accepted model of unionism, even 
for scholars who believe in the importance of unionism as a means of 
vindicating workers’ interests. 
B. Anti-Policism 
Alternatively, we might understand the critiques of police unions as 
actually having little to do with unions, organized labor, or the relationship 
between workers and bosses. Maybe the problem isn’t police unions; maybe 
the problem is police. Such a critique resonates with a growing literature and 
activism that embraces police abolition or the general abolition of the 
carceral state.332 The abolitionist account, like other totalizing critiques of 
the criminal system,333 tends to take as its starting point that the institutions 
and structures of criminal law are rotten to their core.334 
From an abolitionist perspective, everything about the carceral state—
from lawmaking, to policing, to the institutions of punishment—is oppressive 
                                                                                                                           
 332. See, e.g., Mariame Kaba, Summer Heat, New Inquiry (June 8, 2015), 
https://thenewinquiry.com/summer-heat [https://perma.cc/7VMA-4BJY] (outlining steps 
toward police abolition); José Martín, Policing is a Dirty Job, but Nobody’s Gotta Do It: 6 Ideas 
for a Cop-Free World, Rolling Stone (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.rollingstone.com/ 
politics/politics-news/policing-is-a-dirty-job-but-nobodys-gotta-do-it-6-ideas-for-a-cop-free-
world-199465/#ixzz3MAjhe2IM [https://perma.cc/MGK8-8TW3] (highlighting alternatives to 
policing); Purnell, supra note 107 (“Oppressed people must give up the systems that harm 
them. Police are not public, nor good . . . . Police officers are prison–industrial complex 
foot soldiers, and poor people are its targets.”); Alex S. Vitale, What Does It Mean to Be 
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 333. See, e.g., Butler, The System Is Working, supra note 111, at 1456–57 (arguing that 
the system, rather than being “broken” is “working the way it is supposed to”—to harm and 
control poor people of color); Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice 
Reform, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 259, 262–63 (2018) [hereinafter Levin, The Consensus Myth] 
(describing this “mass” or phenomenological critique of the criminal system); McLeod, 
Prison Abolition, supra note 250, at 1161–62 (arguing that prison abolition is warranted to 
overturn core systemic discriminations in the criminal justice system); Roberts, supra note 
99, at 1604–05 (illustrating how criminal law “enforce[s] an undemocratic racial caste 
system originating in slavery”). 
 334. See, e.g., Maya Dukmasova, Abolish the Police? Organizers Say It’s Less Crazy than 
It Sounds, Chi. Reader (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/police-
abolitionist-movement-alternatives-cops-chicago/Content?oid=23289710 [https://perma.cc/XX 
F4-S7V7] (collecting statements by abolitionist activists); Kaba, supra note 332 (“By rhetori-
cally constructing the criminal punishment system as ‘broken,’ reform is reaffirmed and 
abolition is painted as unrealistic and unworkable. Those of us who maintain that reform is 
actually impossible within the current context are positioned as unreasonable and naïve.”). 
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and geared toward the maintenance of social and economic inequality.335 
Policing as an institution cannot be divorced from white supremacy, 
massive disparities in income, and a long history of state and private 
violence against marginalized communities. As sociologist Alex Vitale 
argues, “Modern policing is largely a war on the poor that does little to 
make people safer or communities stronger, and even when it does, this is 
accomplished through the most coercive forms of state power that destroy 
the lives of millions.”336 And abolitionist activist Mariame Kaba argues that 
“[o]n the way to abolition, we can take a number of intermediate steps to 
shrink the police force and to restructure our relationships with each 
other.”337 For Kaba, one of those “intermediate steps” is “abolishing police 
unions.”338 
If one adopts an abolitionist frame, police unions certainly may be 
objectionable. Police unions serve the ends of their members (i.e., police), 
and they enhance the political power of police officers.339 So police unions 
might well be an appropriate target as a lever of power: Policies might 
improve with a greater (or continued) focus on undermining the interests 
of police unions. From this radical perspective, though, the unions are 
objectionable only in that they advance or entrench the power and 
interests of police. Absent a liberal reformist vision of policing, unions are 
not serving to prevent the proper mode or style of policing.340 If one takes 
a liberal legalist approach, police unions are particularly odious because 
                                                                                                                           
 335. See, e.g., Patrisse Cullors, Abolition and Reparations: Histories of Resistance, 
Transformative Justice, and Accountability, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1684, 1686 (2019) (“Abolition 
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 336. Vitale, The End of Policing, supra note 107, at 53–54. 
 337. Kaba, supra note 332. 
 338. Id.; see also Vitale, What Does It Mean, supra note 332. 
 339. See Zoorob, supra note 102, at 247–49 (using evidence from “campaign events, 
data on police political behavior, and vote shares to make the case that widespread 
organizational networks may have been critical” to Trump’s 2016 election). 
 340. Cf. Eric J. Miller, Breaking Windows as Corrective Justice: Impure Resistance in 
Urban Ghettos, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. 313, 315 (2018) (“If racial ghettos ought not exist, as a 
normative matter, then we ought not be satisfied with technocratic and consequentialist 
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they interfere with procedural justice and the sorts of institutional checks 
that might allow for good police governance. But if one rejects the claims 
of the liberal legalist by claiming that “community policing” or “democratic 
policing” are misnomers, then the critique of police unions necessarily 
morphs.341 
I don’t mean to suggest that police abolitionists or other radical com-
mentators are wrong to critique police unions. Again, these unions are 
critical players in debates about policing policy. Any activism to combat 
abusive policing or assert community self-determination necessarily runs 
up against the power of police unions. A failure to grapple with police 
unions would lead back to problematically court-centric accounts of police 
regulation and social change. But it’s important to understand how a 
radical critique differs from a liberal one.342 Certainly, police unions remain 
an object of hostility as a cipher for institutional power. Yet, from a radical 
perspective, the police union is objectionable because of the core function 
of its members, not because it is impeding the proper functioning of good 
governance. Nor is the problem that police officers are speaking or 
bargaining collectively.343 Additionally, where some liberal and progressive 
commentators have suggested that police unions might be reformed or 
repurposed to spur reform,344 the abolitionist critique rejects such a claim 
out of hand: The sort of internal discipline or reexamination that a 
progressive police union might offer certainly would be an improvement 
over the status quo, but the unionized officers (even if they are more 
racially diverse or sympathetic to policing critiques) probably still would 
be committed to preserving their jobs and the institution of the police. 
                                                                                                                           
 341. See Kaba, supra note 332 (rejecting the frame that suggests that the system is 
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1398 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:1333 
 
Arguing against police unions as an abolitionist, then, resembles the 
pacifist’s decision to vote against military appropriations or veterans’ 
benefits: The decision reflects little about the specific policy or the relevant 
employee-benefits-style analysis; rather, opposition reflects a deeper, 
principled rejection of the legitimacy of the institution. Maybe police 
deserve higher pay and better parental leave. Or maybe they don’t. But if 
you don’t believe that police should have a job in the first place, these 
questions are moot. 
I find this to be a theoretically defensible argument. And, in a discus-
sion of the proper allocation of resources for advocacy and activism, this 
argument is important and compelling: Why focus on the rights of police 
when so many other workers are relatively powerless? Indeed, taking the 
military analogy a step further, one might ask (as some queer, left critics 
have) why antimilitarists should be focused on the rights of queer people 
to fight for the state if fighting for the state is inherently objectionable.345 
To be clear, therefore, I am not suggesting that abolitionists should 
embrace police unions. Nor, as a general matter, does this Essay endorse 
a particular strategy for advocates. But I think that abolitionists committed 
to worker power and a broader, worker-centered vision of radical left 
politics should approach police unions with at least some ambivalence. Or, 
at the very least, given the public-sector union parallels Part II highlights, 
prolabor abolitionists should be wary of embracing many anti-police-union 
arguments. 
First, attacking police by arguing for stripping organizing rights legiti-
mates anti-union arguments. Adopting these arguments when faced with 
an unattractive industry or objectionable union helps bolster a set of 
arguments against unions in all cases, or at the very least in cases when 
workers perform controversial labor.346 That is, using the stripping of labor 
rights as a vehicle to combat an industry or to advance policy goals legiti-
mates such a move in other industries or contexts—notably industries and 
contexts that tend to have a very different political valence.347 Dismantling 
                                                                                                                           
 345. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, 
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2020]  POLICE UNIONS 1399 
 
the abusive power structures of the state certainly stands as an abolitionist 
goal, but turning to the logic(s) of neoliberalism to dismantle them seems 
like a risky proposition, particularly if one endorses a vision of abolition as 
a positive project—as rooted in building a new set of noncarceral social 
and political institutions.348 
Second, stripping organizing rights or eliminating unions wouldn’t 
necessarily return power to “the people” or “the community.” As noted 
above, most relevant policy determinations simply would revert to local 
governments.349 So a critique of police unions that isn’t coupled with a 
deeper critique of governance would do little to shift the balance of power: 
Local governments have signed off on the CBAs that prevent police 
accountability and endorse objectionable use-of-force rules, so why should 
we trust those same government actors to produce better police govern-
ance or to embrace abolitionist politics in the absence of heavy union 
involvement? 
Indeed, radical or abolitionist critiques of police and the carceral 
system as a whole tend to rest on a critique of the current structures of 
representative democracy. Even deeply nonradical critiques of the crimi-
nal system tend to argue that the carceral state represents the apotheosis 
of a massive democratic failure.350 But, to abolitionists, there is little solace 
in arguments that current criminal law and criminal policy are the result 
of legislative decisionmaking or somehow reflect the popular, democratic 
will. The problem with police unions from an abolitionist perspective 
really is a problem with the ability to dismantle the structures of modern 
policing. Currently, unions stand guard over those structures, but so too 
do the elected officials who capitulate to union demands and sacrifice 
community will on the altar of political expediency. Reducing these 
problems to a critique of union power would effectively let politicians off 
the hook and would suggest that management—the same management 
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that has presided over contemporary police practices—should be allowed 
to emerge relatively unscathed. 
CONCLUSION 
For scholars and activists concerned about mass incarceration, there’s 
a lot not to like about police unions. There is a great deal of work to be 
done in better understanding police unions, their legal and political role, 
and their place in broader reformist or radical projects. Emphasizing the 
role of police unions reflects a welcome departure from court-centric and 
formalistic treatments of policing. Appreciating the role of unions in the 
criminal system reflects an important turn to grapple with the political 
economy of criminal law and to take seriously the incentives and institu-
tions that have helped to undergird the carceral state. 
Ultimately, I don’t disagree with the critiques of police unions preva-
lent in the literature. As a descriptive matter, they certainly are right: 
Police unions have fought to shield their members from public scrutiny 
and legal accountability. And police unions repeatedly have rallied behind 
politicians hostile to criminal justice reform, racial justice, and labor 
rights. But embracing these critiques uncritically would be a mistake, yet 
another example of a broad tendency to treat criminal law as exceptional 
and divorced from important conversations about labor politics, worker 
power, and the social and political fabric of society. 
By encouraging a nuanced and critical examination of police unions 
and their flaws, I hope to suggest that there are major lessons to takeaway 
for both labor and policing scholars. For scholars of labor law, recognizing 
the shortcomings of police unions should contribute to a broader 
reckoning with the vision of labor power and with the theoretical 
justifications of labor law. Is the imagined “good” union one that actually 
doesn’t exert too much power? Are the politics at the heart of pro-union 
scholarship reliant on radical notions of class solidarity or on 
liberal/progressive pragmatism designed to increase the relative strength 
of the Democratic Party or its political analogs? As Fisk and Richardson 
have argued, perhaps we might see in police unions a strong case for a 
shift toward “minority” unions that could advance the interest of 
dissenting voices within a police force.351 And, perhaps such a lesson can 
be extended—to the extent that police unions represent the epitome of 
the “bad kind” of unionism,352 perhaps the critiques of police unions can 
contribute to a growing literature that seeks to envision new modes of 
worker organizing outside of the NLRA model of exclusive bargaining. 
That is, recognizing “what’s wrong with police unions” should help us to 
figure out what sort of labor law would be desirable or, at least, what 
normative commitments should be furthered by labor regulation. 
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 352. See Gude, Support Police Unions, supra note 65. 
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For policing scholars, police unions similarly should force hard 
questions: To what extent is the call for reform a call for “community” or 
“democratic” policing, which in turn rests on some vision of liberal 
reform?353 If so, what sorts of illiberal policies might be acceptable to 
ensure that regulators can bring police to heel? To the extent that critique 
comes from a place of radicalism, though, should that change the calculus 
as to which tactics are desirable? If the ultimate goal is abolishing police, 
does that call for or justify support for legal or procedural tactics that 
strengthen other problematic state institutions?354 That is, recognizing 
“what’s wrong with police unions” should help us understand what sort of 
policing oversight might be sufficient and exactly how deep the structural 
critiques of policing in the United States go. 
Answering these questions is and will be a tall order. Taking police 
unions seriously has already paid dividends for scholars and activists 
concerned about policing’s role as a driver of inequality. But taking police 
unions seriously should require a deeper understanding of their place not 
only in the criminal system, but also in broader discussions about worker 
power and law enforcement in the political economy of postindustrial 
capitalism. 
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